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SUPERVISED RELEASE IS NOT PAROLE
Jacob Schuman*
The United States has the largest prison population in the
developed world. Yet outside prisons, there are almost twice as many
people serving terms of criminal supervision in the community—
probation, parole, and supervised release. At the federal level, this “mass
supervision” of convicted offenders began with the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, which abolished parole and created a harsher and more
expansive system called supervised release. Last term in United States v.
Haymond, the Supreme Court took a small step against mass supervision
by striking down one provision of the supervised release statute as
violating the right to a jury trial. But the Justices did not consider all the
differences between parole and supervised release, which have far
broader consequences for the constitutional law of community
supervision.
The current consensus among the courts of appeals is that
supervised release is “constitutionally indistinguishable” from parole
and therefore governed by the same minimal standard of due process.
Closer inspection, however, reveals three significant differences between
parole and supervised release. First, parole was a relief from
punishment, while supervised release is an additional penalty. Second,
parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised release
revocation is punitive. Finally, parole was run by an agency, while
supervised release is controlled by courts. Because of these differences,
revocation of supervised release should be governed by a higher
standard of due process than revocation of parole. In particular,
defendants on supervised release deserve more protection against
delayed revocation hearings, which may deny them the opportunity to
seek concurrent sentencing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has the largest prison population in the
developed world: 2.3 million people behind bars.1 Yet outside prison
walls, there are almost twice as many people, 4.5 million, serving
terms of criminal supervision in the community—probation, parole,
and supervised release.2 This “mass supervision” of convicted
defendants is, as the District Attorney of Philadelphia Larry Krasner
recently said, “a major driver of mass incarceration.”3 Currently,
almost 300,000 people are incarcerated for violating conditions of
their supervision—one third of all prisoners in thirteen states, and
more than half of all prisoners in Arkansas, Idaho, Missouri, and
Wisconsin.4 Proceedings to revoke community supervision are
governed by only a minimum standard of due process, with no right to
a jury and no right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.5
Mass supervision at the federal level began with the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which abolished the old parole regime and
created a harsher and more expansive system called “supervised
release.” Today, over 100,000 people are serving terms of supervised
release—five times more than were under parole—and over 10,000
people are in federal prison for violating the conditions of their
release.6 Last term in United States v. Haymond,7 the Supreme Court
took a small step against mass supervision by striking down one
provision of the supervised release statute as violating the defendant’s

1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.
2. DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NCJ251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 1 (Apr. 2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf.
3. Press Release, Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, New Philadelphia D.A.O. Policies
Announced March 21, 2019 to End Mass Supervision (Mar. 21, 2019)
https://medium.com/philadelphia-justice/philadelphia-daos-policies-to-end-mass-supervisionfd5988cfe1f1.
4. Alan Greenblatt, Probation and Parole Violations Are Filling up Prisons and Costing
States Billions, GOVERNING (June 18, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/publicjustice-safety/gov-parole-probation-report-criminal-justice.html.
5. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., NUMBER OF OFFENDERS ON FEDERAL SUPERVISED RELEASE
HITS ALL-TIME HIGH (Jan. 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2017/01/number_of_
offenders_on_federal_supervised_release_hits_alltime_high.pdf.
6. Jacob Schuman, America’s Shadow Criminal Justice System, NEW REPUBLIC,
(May 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148592/americas-shadow-criminal-justicesystem.
7. 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).
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right to a jury trial.8 But the Justices did not consider all the differences
between parole and supervised release, which have far broader
consequences for the constitutional law of community supervision.9
Until Haymond, supervised release had received scant attention
from either scholars or courts.10 During the 1970s, the Supreme Court
issued three major decisions on the constitutional rights of parolees,
holding that parole revocation was governed by a minimal standard of
due process with no other protections under the Bill of Rights.11 Yet
after Congress created supervised release in 1984, the Court spent
more than thirty years in silence as to how this new system fit into the
nation’s constitutional framework. Meanwhile, a consensus arose
among the courts of appeals that supervised release was simply a
continuation of the old parole system and therefore governed by the
old parole precedents. Declaring that parole and supervised release
revocations were “constitutionally indistinguishable and . . . analyzed
in the same manner,”12 the circuit courts held that defendants facing
revocation of supervised release were entitled to the same bare
minimum standard of due process as parolees: a hearing before a judge
(but not a jury), with a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of
proof (rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt), no Fourth
Amendment rights, no right against self-incrimination, no right to a

8. Id. at 2378–79.
9. Id. at 2380.
10. Fiona Doherty and Christine S. Scott-Hayward are the only legal scholars to have
published extensive analyses of supervised release, and this Article is indebted to their work. See
Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 958, 960 (2013); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of
Federal Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 182–83 (2013). The Federal Sentencing
Reporter also dedicated a helpful 1994 issue to the subject. See David N. Adair, Revocation of
Supervised Release—A Judicial Function, 6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 190 (1994); Paula Kei Biderman &
Jon M. Sands, A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP.
204 (1994); Sharon O. Henegan, Revocation of Probation and Supervised Release: A Commission
Perspective, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 199 (1994); Carlos Juenke, Using Internal Intermediate Sanctions
to Avoid Revocation of Supervised Release for Cocaine Use, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 210 (1994);
George P. Kazen, Mandatory Revocation for Drug Use: A Plea for Reconsideration, 6 FED. SENT’G
REP. 202 (1994); Keith A. Koenning, Supervised Release Violators and the Comprehensive
Sanctions Center in the Northern District of Ohio, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 208 (1994); Michael A.
Stover, The Future of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 195 (1994); Barbara M. Vincent,
Supervised Release: Looking for a Place in a Determinate Sentencing System, 6 FED. SENT’G REP.
187 (1994); Thomas N. Whiteside, The New Challenge of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP.
211 (1994).
11. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
12. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005).
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speedy trial, no Confrontation Clause right, no right to effective
assistance of counsel, and no rights under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.13
Haymond is the Supreme Court’s first major decision on the
constitutional law of supervised release. Spotlighting the important
role of community supervision in the federal criminal justice system,
the case also left the Court intractably divided. In a splintered 4–1–4
vote, five Justices agreed to strike down one provision of the
supervised release statute that imposed a five-year mandatory
minimum sentence on sex offenders who violated their release by
committing another sex offense. But unable to settle on a majority
opinion, the Justices split over how best to understand the relationship
between parole and supervised release.
Justice Gorsuch wrote a plurality opinion, emphasizing “[a]ll that
changed beginning in 1984” when “Congress overhauled federal
sentencing procedures to make prison terms more determinate and
abolish the practice of parole.”14 While parole supervision replaced
prison time, he explained, supervised release is imposed “to encourage
rehabilitation after the completion” of a full prison sentence.15 This
difference “bears constitutional consequences,” because under
Apprendi v. New Jersey,16 any fact increasing a sentencing range must
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Parole revocation
complied with this rule because it “generally exposed a defendant only
to the remaining prison term authorized for his crime of conviction,”
but the five-year mandatory minimum violated it by “expos[ing] a

13. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A) (procedure for revocation hearing before judge); see
also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (preponderance of the evidence standard
of proof) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)); United States v. Hulen, 879 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.
2018) (no right against self-incrimination); United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260–62 (9th
Cir. 2008) (no speedy trial); United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2005) (no
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393–94 (4th Cir. 1999) (no
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 113–14 (11th Cir.
1994) (no Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Allgood, 48 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (E.D. Va.
1999) (no effective assistance of counsel). Even the few favorable decisions for defendants on
supervised release compared the system to parole. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117,
1122–23 (2d Cir. 1994) (retroactive application of mandatory-minimum revocation sentence
violated Ex Post Facto Clause).
14. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382.
15. Id.
16. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
17. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2381–82.
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defendant to an additional . . . prison term well beyond that authorized
by the jury’s verdict.”18
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence for himself only, agreeing that
the five-year mandatory minimum was unconstitutional because it was
too trial-like, but not applying Apprendi because of “the potentially
destabilizing consequences.”19 He stressed that the mandatory
minimum was an unusually punitive outlier from the rest of the
supervised release system, which he said was otherwise similar to
parole.20
Finally, Justice Alito wrote a very frustrated dissent calling the
plurality opinion “revolutionary” and even “dangerous” for casting
doubt on supervised release.21 He argued that there was no Apprendi
problem because the original jury verdict itself authorized the judge to
impose the five-year mandatory minimum, and called the plurality’s
distinction between parole and supervised release “purely formal”
with “no constitutional consequences.”22
The majority vote in Haymond is an important reaffirmance of the
right to a jury trial in an age of mass supervision. It is also the Court’s
first official recognition of one significant difference between parole
and supervised release: parole replaced prison time, while supervised
release adds to it. Nevertheless, the opinions are limited in focus. The
Justices solely considered the jury trial right, without addressing the
broader due process analysis. The Justices also appeared to agree that
parole was otherwise similar to supervised release, with the plurality
and dissent describing them as rehabilitative and Justice Breyer stating
that the role of the judge was the same in each system.23
Although Haymond represents a step forward in understanding
the constitutional relationship between parole and supervised release,
the Court’s analysis was incomplete. Closer inspection actually
reveals three critical differences between the systems:

18. Id. at 2382.
19. Id. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., concurring).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2386, 2399 (Alito, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2388.
23. See also id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring) (role of judge same under supervised release
and parole). Compare id. at 2382 (plurality opinion) (supervised release and parole both
rehabilitative), with id. at 2389 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that supervised release and parole
were both intended to provide a period of reform so that a prisoner could return to society and lead
a law-abiding life).
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•

Parole was a relief from punishment, while supervised
release is an additional penalty.
• Parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised
release revocation is punitive.
• Parole was run by an agency, while supervised release is
controlled by courts.
Because of these differences, the Supreme Court’s parole
revocation precedents should not apply to supervised release. Instead,
defendants on supervised release deserve more procedural protections
before their release is revoked. Treating supervised release like parole
can result in significant unfair prejudice to criminal defendants,
especially when they challenge delayed hearings to revoke release.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II recounts the history of
parole and supervised release. Part III reviews the caselaw. Part IV
shows how parole and supervised release differ in three significant
respects and explains why those differences matter for the
constitutional law of community supervision. Finally, Part V applies
this analysis to the right to a timely revocation hearing, showing how
applying parole precedents to supervised release unfairly denies
criminal defendants the opportunity to seek concurrent sentences.
II. THE HISTORY OF PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE
The origins of mass supervision predate the modern prison itself.
Beginning in the Australian penal colony in the eighteenth century,
humanitarian reformers advocated rehabilitating criminal offenders by
promising them early relief from punishment. This practice eventually
won support in the United States, where it became known as “parole,”
an essential feature of American criminal justice. In the 1960s and
1970s, however, Americans lost faith in the rehabilitative theory of
punishment, leading Congress to enact the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, which abolished parole and created supervised release.
Supervised release was initially intended to be limited and
rehabilitative, but a series of amendments over the next two decades
transformed it into a harsher and more expansive system.
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A. Origins of Early Release
The history of parole begins in 1787, with the British penal colony
in Australia.24 At the time, criminal conduct was punished with fines,
torture, or death, while prisons served merely to hold defendants
pending trial.25 But as the crime rate rose at the end of the eighteenth
century and “[w]holesale hangings” of criminal offenders grew
unpopular, British courts began offering the choice of an alternative
punishment—exile in a foreign colony, also known as
“transportation.”26
Over the next eighty years, Britain transported over 150,000
convicts to its penal colony in Australia, where a colonial Board of
Assignment “leased” them to newly arriving settlers.27 The convicts
worked without compensation, while the settlers paid the government
“to cover the cost of their maintenance.”28 If a convict “behaved well”
for four, six, or eight years (depending on the length of his sentence),
then he could earn a “ticket of leave” that would excuse him from
further labor.29 But even those convicts who received tickets were
subject to strict rules and denied basic civil rights, including the right
to own property.30
Eventually, this exploitative system prompted calls for reform,
planting the seeds of an idea that would one day grow into parole. In
1836, the London Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline
persuaded the British government to send a colonial official from
Tasmania, Alexander Maconochie, to investigate the mistreatment of
Australian convicts.31 Maconochie published a searing critique of the

24. See Helen Leland Witmer, The History, Theory and Results of Parole, 18 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 24, 26 (1927).
25. See id. at 24–25.
26. Id. at 25; see also Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and
Parole System, 16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 11 (1925).
27. See Witmer, supra note 24, at 25–26; Lindsey, supra note 26, at 11. Convict leasing was
justified on the ground that the government had paid to transport the convicts to Australia. See
Doherty, supra note 10, at 965. The practice appears to be an outgrowth of British courts paying
private contractors to transport convicts to North America with “a property right in the services of
the felons.” Witmer, supra note 24, at 24.
28. Doherty, supra note 10, at 965.
29. Id. (quoting William Molesworth, Sir, SELECT COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION xvii
(1837–38)).
30. ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, AUSTRALIANA: THOUGHTS ON CONVICT MANAGEMENT
AND OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PENAL COLONIES 3–4 (London, John
W. Parker, West Strand 1839).
31. Doherty, supra note 10, at 966.
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colony, condemning what he saw as a “disguised system of slavery.”32
Convicts lived in the “roughest manner,” he reported, “subject to the
most severe regulations” and “equally severe punishments,” including
“the chain-gang or the triangle, or . . . hard labor on the roads.”33
Tickets of leave promised eventual relief, but they were difficult to
earn, because “[t]he record kept of prisoners’ conduct only embraces
offences,” not “good ordinary behaviour.”34 Tickets also could be
revoked for “trifling irregularities” and “on very slight occasion,” so a
“very large proportion” of ticket holders were eventually forced back
into labor.35
Maconochie proposed that the penal colony’s fundamental flaw
was its lack of concern for the convicts’ wellbeing and development.
“The essential and obvious error,” he declared, was the “total neglect
of moral reasoning and influence, and [the] exclusive reliance, in
every relation of life, on mere physical coercion.”36 As a result, “[t]he
prisoners are all made bad men instead of good.”37 Instead, he
suggested, penal officials should encourage their captives’ moral
reform. According to him, convicts should not be sentenced to a term
of years, but instead required to earn “a fixed number of marks of
commendation” in order to win release.38 Convicts would be awarded
“marks” for good behavior and lose them for bad, with the rules of the
colony enforced “merely by the gain, or loss, of marks.”39 By
collecting more and more marks, a convict would earn “successive
degrees” of freedom, eventually leading to total release.40 Under this
system, Maconochie predicted, criminals would be motivated to better
themselves: “[W]hen a man keeps the key of his own prison, he is soon
persuaded to fit it to the lock.”41

32. MACONOCHIE, supra note 30, at 37.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id. at 7–8.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 23; see also MACONOCHIE, supra note 30, at 21 (“I am
convinced that the Social decorums, virtues, and feelings, which would be thus early and
universally elicited, would have the most powerful effect in changing the characters of many, even
of the very hardened.”).
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Maconochie’s proposal became known as the “mark system,”42
one principle of a broader penal reform movement that advocated for
a more humane approach to criminal justice by rehabilitating
offenders, rather than inflicting suffering.43 In the 1850s, Australia
won limited self-government and began refusing to accept more
convicts, leading the British to turn to prisons as a primary method of
punishing criminal defendants.44 At last forced to reckon with how to
administer a large and growing population of domestic prisoners,
prison officials in both England and Ireland drew on Maconochie’s
ideas, experimenting with “progressive stages of confinement” that
rewarded good behavior by advancing inmates from solitary
imprisonment, to communal labor, and finally to freedom.45
Like Maconochie’s mark system, these new programs reflected a
rehabilitative mindset.46 Walter Crofton, chair of the Board of
Directors of Convict Prisons for Ireland, claimed his “system of
measuring the industry and improvement of the criminal, and crediting
him with an intelligible value for it” made each prisoner “the arbiter
of his own fate, and . . . induced to co-operate with those placed over
him in their efforts for his improvement.”47 Joshua Jebb, chair of the
English Board, described his “principle of graduation” in similar
terms: “Whilst advocating a stringent and repressive system of

42. Doherty, supra note 10, at 967. Maconochie was not the only one to advocate for early
release as a means of rehabilitating criminal offenders. A French reformer proposed a similar idea
in 1838: “Since the principal aim of the penalty is the reform of the convict, it is desirable that any
convict whose moral regeneration is sufficiently assured should be set free.” MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 269 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed.,
1979) (1977).
43. See Jacob Schuman, Sentencing Rules and Standards: How We Decide Criminal
Punishment, 83 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8–9 n.28 (2015). The National Prison Association declared in
1870: “The treatment of criminals by society is for the protection of society. But since such
treatment is directed to the criminal rather than to the crime, its great object should be his moral
regeneration. Hence the supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the
infliction of vindictive suffering.” Id.
44. Witmer, supra note 24, at 30–31, 34–36.
45. Doherty, supra note 10, at 970–75; Witmer, supra note 24, at 39.
46. While similar, the Irish and English mark systems differed in important respects, including
that release was revocable in the Irish system, but not in the English. See Doherty, supra note 10,
at 973–76; Witmer, supra note 24, at 39–40.
47. Walter Crofton, The Irish System of Prison Discipline, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE
NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 67 (E.C. Wines ed.,
Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1871).
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discipline . . . I am no less impressed with the advantage of
encouraging good conduct by the hope of reward.”48
B. Development of Parole
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the mark system
won converts across the Atlantic and took root in the United States. In
the 1860s, the New York Prison Association began promoting the
work of Maconochie, Crofton, and Jebb, declaring that prison should
serve “as an adult reformatory, where the object is to teach and train
the prisoner in such a manner that, on his discharge, he may be able to
resist temptation and inclined to lead an upright, worthy life.”49 Early
release for good behavior was key to achieving this goal, because it
“plac[ed] the prisoner’s fate . . . in his own hands by enabling him,
through industry and good conduct, to raise himself, step by step, to a
position of less restraint; while idleness and bad conduct, on the other
hand, keep him in a state of coercion and restraint.”50
In 1876, the New York legislature agreed to implement these
ideas at a new prison in Elmira.51 At the Elmira Reformatory, prisoners
would be sentenced to a fixed term of years, but the board of managers
would also have the “power to establish rules and regulations under
which prisoners . . . may be allowed to go upon parole outside of the
reformatory buildings and inclosure [sic].”52 Eligibility for “parole”
(derived from the French for “word of honor”53) would be based on “a
system of marks,” which would be “credited for good personal
demeanor, diligence in labor and study and for results accomplished”
and “charged for derelictions, negligences and offenses.”54 The board
48. Joshua Jebb, Prison Discipline, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 434 (George W. Hastings ed., London, John W. Parker, Son,
and Bourne, West Strand, 1863).
49. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 17 (quoting F.H. WINES, PRISON REFORM, CHARITIES
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE 26 (1910)); see also Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the
United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 488 (1999).
50. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 17 (quoting F.H. WINES, PRISON REFORM, CHARITIES
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE 26 (1910)); see also Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9
YALE L.J. 17, 19 (1899) (“Let society hold its enemy in duress until he ceases to be its enemy. This
rule protects the community and furnishes to the criminal the motive for adjusting himself to its
order.”).
51. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 17, 21.
52. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE N.Y. STATE REFORMATORY AT
ELMIRA, N.Y. FOR THE YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1888 54 (1889) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT].
53. Doherty, supra note 10, at 981 n.139.
54. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 55–56.
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of managers would also enjoy “full power” to “retake and reimprison
any convict” who violated the “rules and regulations” governing his
release.55
Zebulon Brockway, superintendent of Elmira, advocated this
system as a way to encourage prisoners to rehabilitate themselves:
Captivity, always irksome, is now unceasingly so
because . . . the duty and responsibility of shortening it and
of modifying any undesirable present condition of it devolve
upon the prisoner himself . . . . Naturally, these
circumstances serve to arouse and rivet the attention upon the
many matters of the daily conduct which so affect the rate of
progress toward the coveted release. . . . Habitual careful
attention with accompanying expectancy and appropriate
exertion and resultant clarified vision constitute a habitus not
consistent with criminal tendencies.56
Brockway was apparently good on his word—nine out of ten inmates
at Elmira earned early release from prison within their first three
years.57
The experiment at Elmira quickly won converts across the
country.58 Between 1875 and 1900, twenty states passed laws allowing
prisoners to earn early release for good behavior; by 1927, the number
was forty-seven; and by the 1950s, every state in the nation had
embraced parole.59 The federal government enacted its own Parole Act
in 1910,60 creating a separate parole board for each federal prison, later
consolidated in a single United States Parole Commission in
Washington, D.C., with members appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.61
Under the federal parole system, sentencing worked as follows:
A district judge would sentence a defendant to a fixed term of years of
55. Id. at 54–55.
56. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 27–28.
57. Doherty, supra note 10, at 982.
58. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 30–32.
59. Doherty, supra note 10, at 982–83; Petersilia, supra note 49, at 489; Lindsey, supra note
26, at 30–40.
60. Parole Act, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819 (1910), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)). Before
1910, federal prisoners received “good-time” credit for each month they obeyed prison rules, with
no supervision after their release. Lindsey, supra note 26, at 56.
61. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part I (1910–1972), 61 FED.
PROB. 23, 23 (1997).

(7) 53.3_SCHUMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

SUPERVISED RELEASE IS NOT PAROLE

7/7/2020 2:51 PM

599

imprisonment from within a range set by statute.62 After he had served
one-third of that term, the Parole Commission could grant him early
release from prison if he had “substantially observed the rules of the
institution” and his return to the community would neither “depreciate
the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law” nor
“jeopardize the public welfare.”63 Upon release, the parolee would be
subject to supervision by a parole officer, who would enforce
“conditions of parole” set by the Commission.64 If the Commission
found that the parolee had violated a condition, then it could revoke
his parole and send him back to prison to serve out the remainder of
his original sentence.65 Representative Henry D. Clayton of Alabama,
who introduced the parole legislation in the House, declared it “in
accordance with the enlightened sentiment of the day, the progressive
spirit of the times, and in harmony with the philanthropy of the day
and age, that would aid suffering humanity and at the same time lend
a helping hand toward the reformation of convicted criminals.”66
C. Turn Against Indeterminate Sentencing
By the 1970s, parole “ha[d] become an integral part of the
[country’s] penological system.”67 At the system’s height, the Parole
Commission granted early release to more than two-thirds of federal
inmates,68 and parole boards across the country granted it in
approximately three-fourths of all cases.69 Parole fit into a model of
criminal punishment known as “indeterminate sentencing,” where the
penalty for the crime was not fully determined in advance of its
commission.70 Instead, Congress defined a statutory range for each
offense, the judge selected a sentence from within that range for each
62. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (2012).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(a) (2012), 4206(a) (2012) (repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006));
see also Vincent, supra note 10, 187 n.1 (“Within these parameters, the United States Parole
Commission selected the actual time of release by either setting a parole date or deciding that the
inmate should be held until his or her mandatory release date.”).
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4209 (repealed 1987), 4214 (2012) (repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)).
65. Id.
66. Doherty, supra note 10, at 984–85.
67. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
68. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 30 (1979) (Marshall,
J., dissenting in part).
69. Petersilia, supra note 49, at 489.
70. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
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defendant, and the parole board determined when prisoners were ready
to be released.71
Yet, after one-hundred years of dominance, parole started to lose
support. In the 1960s and 1970s, a bipartisan consensus emerged in
favor of a more determinate approach to punishment.72 Critics on the
left questioned the moral authority of parole boards to decide whether
a person was ready to leave prison and criticized socio-economic
disparities in who was granted parole.73 Critics on the right argued that
criminal offenders deserved to be punished for their crimes, not
released early or coddled with attempts at reform.74 Widely-read
empirical studies suggested that prisons “have had no appreciable
effect on recidivism,”75 leading many to doubt “that prison programs
could ‘rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis’—or that parole
officers could ‘determine accurately whether or when a particular
prisoner ha[d] been rehabilitated.’”76
Parole’s most influential critic was Judge Marvin Frankel of the
Southern District of New York, who condemned indeterminate
sentencing in his 1972 book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without
Order.77 Judge Frankel described parole boards as capricious and
secretive, and questioned their “supposed expertise” in predicting
when any particular inmate was ready for release.78 He argued that the
arbitrariness of the parole boards’ decisions encouraged prisoners to
become cynical and manipulative: “The theory of rehabilitative
benefit from the striving for parole is dissolved in an acid certainty
among the supposed beneficiaries that the task is to find the muscle or
the stratagems for beating a rotten system.”79
71. See id. at 364–65; Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679,
680–84 (1996).
72. Schuman, supra note 43, at 11–12.
73. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365–66; Petersilia, supra note 49, at 492–93; see also KENNETH
C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 11–12 (1969).
74. See Doherty, supra note 10, at 993–94; see also ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 182 (1975) (“It seems almost a
truism that criminals should be punished so there will be less crime.”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 37 (Ne. Univ. Press ed., 1986) (1976).
75. Doherty, supra note 10, at 994; see also Schuman, supra note 43, at 11 (“Anecdotal and
empirical evidence suggested that prisons were not reforming most offenders; meanwhile, crime
rates were rising.”).
76. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 324–25 (2011) (citation omitted).
77. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 90 (1973).
78. Id. at 90, 109.
79. Id. at 49.
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Judge Frankel’s opposition to parole reflected his firm rejection
of the rehabilitative theory of punishment.80 Sentencing policy in the
mid-twentieth century was based on a “medical” model of
imprisonment that echoed Maconochie’s call for the moral
improvement of criminal offenders, viewing them as “sick” and
needing “treatment” in prison.81 Parole boards were essential to this
effort because they served “to administer indeterminate sentences by
determining when the ‘patient’ was cured.”82 Judge Frankel ridiculed
this idea: “We sentence many people every day who are not ‘sick’ in
any identifiable respect, and are certainly not candidates for any form
of therapy or ‘rehabilitation’ known thus far. . . . Instead, they have
coldly and deliberately figured the odds, risked punishment for
rewards large enough . . . to justify the risk, but then had the
misfortune to be caught.”83 Therefore, he argued, “there should be no
occasion for an indeterminate sentence,” since all legitimate
sentencing considerations were “knowable on the day of
sentencing.”84 “[T]he apparatus of parole and parole-board procedures
needs drastic revision,” he declared, suggesting that all prisoners
should serve “a definite sentence, known and justified on the day of
sentencing.”85
D. End of Parole
What followed in the late 1970s was “a true ‘sentencing
revolution’ in which the highly-discretionary indeterminate
sentencing systems that had been dominant for nearly a century” were
“replaced by a diverse array of sentencing structures.”86 Despite this
diversity, reformers were united in their goal of making sentences
more determinate by abolishing parole and requiring defendants to
serve their full prison terms.87 Legislation inspired by Judge Frankel’s
80. Id. at 90, 109.
81. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States: An Historical and
Conceptual Overview, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 117, 128 (1976); FRANKEL,
supra note 77, at 89; see also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387,
388–89 (2006) (“The rehabilitative ideal was often conceived and discussed in medical terms . . .
.”); MACONOCHIE, supra note 30, at 7–8 (discussing the need for moral reasoning and influence).
82. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (1991).
83. FRANKEL, supra note 77, at 90, 109.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 98, 116.
86. Berman, supra note 81, at 395.
87. See id.
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proposals failed at the federal level in 1975, but inspired states to begin
eliminating their parole systems one by one.88 Maine went first in
1976, followed by California and Indiana.89 By 1984, ten states had
ended parole, and by the year 2000, every state in the country had
enacted determinate sentencing reforms.90
Congress abolished the federal parole system in the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which enacted “sweeping reforms” to the
nation’s criminal justice system.91 The Act implemented Judge
Frankel’s proposals by creating a determinate sentencing system in
which defendants would serve their prison terms in full, with no
opportunity for parole.92 The Act also expressly rejected the
rehabilitative theory of imprisonment, instructing sentencing courts to
“recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”93 The Senate Report linked
this rejection of rehabilitation to the abolition of parole: “[A]lmost
everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that
rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now
quite certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner
is rehabilitated.”94
Although the Sentencing Reform Act abolished parole, it still
offered two extremely limited ways for prisoners to earn early
release.95 First, every year a prisoner “displayed exemplary
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations,” he could
receive thirty-six days of “good time” credit, or approximately 10
percent off his sentence.96 Second, the Act instructed the Bureau of
Prisons, “to the extent practicable,” to allow prisoners to “spend[] a

88. Doherty, supra note 10, at 995.
89. Petersilia, supra note 49, at 494–95.
90. See Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing
Parole: The Long-Term Impacts on Prisons and Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 108 (1996);
Berman, supra note 81, at 394 n.41; Petersilia, supra note 49, at 495.
91. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
92. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228–30 (1993); Doherty, supra
note 10, at 995.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012); see also Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 324–25 (2011)
(“[T]he system’s attempt to ‘achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed.’” (quoting Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 366)); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366–67.
94. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
95. Doherty, supra note 10, at 996; Stith & Koh, supra note 92, at 226, n.10.
96. Doherty, supra note 10, at 996; Stith & Koh, supra note 92, at 226, n.10. This figure was
later increased to fifty-four days. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012).
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portion of the final months of [their] term (not to exceed 12 months),
under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity
to adjust to and prepare for the reentry . . . into the community.”97 In
practice, this meant prisoners would spend the last few months of their
sentences in a halfway house or community correctional facility, with
probation officers available to “offer assistance” during this time.98
E. Creation of Supervised Release
To replace parole supervision after prison, the Sentencing Reform
Act created a new kind of sentence called “supervised release.” Since
the Parole Commission no longer had a role to play, the same judge
who imposed the prison sentence was also assigned the power to
choose a set of conditions that the defendant would have to obey for a
term of years following his release.99 Supervised release would be
imposed at the sentencing hearing, at the same time as the sentence of
imprisonment.
This change was intended to rationalize the imposition of postrelease supervision. Under parole, the length of the supervision term
depended on “the time left on the original sentence,” rather than “the
needs of the defendant.”100 As a result, parole terms were often lengthy
and irrational. A well-behaved prisoner would be granted early release
and then have to serve a long term of supervision in the community,
while a poorly-behaved prisoner would not be granted release and so
would have no supervision at all. Under supervised release, by
contrast, judges would impose supervised release based on the
individual facts of each case, so that “probation officers will only be
supervising those releasees . . . who actually need supervision.”101 The
legislative history gives as specific examples a defendant who will
serve a very long prison sentence and need transitional support to
return to the community, or a defendant with a special “need[]” for
“supervision and training programs after release.102

97. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (2012).
98. Id. § 3624(c)(3).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2016), invalidated by United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153
(10th Cir. 2017); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A(2)(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
100. Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204.
101. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
102. Id. at 124.
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Perhaps most significantly, the Sentencing Reform Act provided
no mechanism to revoke a defendant’s supervised release.103 Neither
judges nor probation officers would have the power to send defendants
back to prison for violating their conditions of release, because
Congress “did not believe that a minor violation of a condition of
supervised release should result in resentencing of the defendant,” and
“a more serious violation [c]ould be dealt with as a new offense.”104
Only if a defendant repeatedly and flagrantly violated the conditions
of his release could the government charge him with criminal
contempt of court, but this would require a trial affording the
defendant full constitutional protections.105 Supervised release would
“provide rehabilitative services, but not in the guise of the coerced
cure.”106
Yet just two years after passing the Sentencing Reform Act,
Congress enacted the first in a series of amendments that transformed
supervised release into a harsher and more expansive system. The
most significant change came in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
which added a revocation mechanism empowering judges to “revoke
a term of supervised release” and sentence a defendant to
imprisonment if the United States Attorney’s Office proved “by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition
of supervised release.”107 Proceedings to revoke supervised release
would be governed by the same rules as parole revocation, set forth in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.108
Over the next two decades, Congress voted again and again to
extend the reach of the supervised release system and enhance the
penalties for violations. In addition to adding a revocation mechanism,
the 1986 Act imposed mandatory minimum terms of supervised
release on federal defendants convicted of drug-trafficking crimes.109
In 1987, Congress voted to increase both the terms of supervised
release and the prison sentences for violations.110 In 1994, Congress

103. See Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204.
104. See id.; Harry B. Wooten, Violation of Supervised Release: Erosion of a Promising
Congressional Idea into Troubled Policy and Practice, 6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 183, 183 (1994).
105. Doherty, supra note 10, at 999–1000.
106. Id. at 999.
107. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-7.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 3207-3–3207-5.
110. Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, §§ 8, 25, 101 Stat. 1266, 1267, 1272.
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enacted a “mandatory revocation” provision, requiring judges to
revoke release and impose a sentence of imprisonment if a defendant
violated his release by possessing a controlled substance, possessing a
firearm, or refusing a drug test.111 That same year, Congress also
authorized judges to impose additional terms of supervised release as
punishment when defendants violated their original terms of
supervised release.112 In 2002, Congress expanded mandatory
revocation by requiring judges to impose a sentence of imprisonment
on defendants who failed three drug tests in a single year.113 Finally,
in 2003, Congress increased the prison sentences for multiple
supervised release violations and implemented lifetime supervised
release and mandatory revocation for sex offenders.114
The legislative history for these amendments is very thin,115 and
what exists does not suggest a rehabilitative mission. The revocation
mechanism was the result of lobbying by probation officials who
sought greater leverage to enforce conditions of supervised release
against defendants.116 The House Report accompanying the 2003
amendment cited the views of “prosecutors regarding the inadequacy
of the existing supervision periods for sex offenders . . . whose
criminal conduct may reflect deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders
that are not likely to disappear within a few years of release from
prison.”117
The Sentencing Commission also played a significant role in
expanding and toughening supervised release.118 As the agency
created by the Sentencing Reform Act to promulgate federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the Commission’s very first edition in 1987
directed that district courts “shall” impose a term of supervised release
111. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110505,
108 Stat. 1796, 2016–17.
112. Id. at 2017.
113. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107273, § 2103, 116 Stat. 1758, 1793 (2002).
114. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 101, 117 Stat. 651, 652.
115. See Doherty, supra note 10, at 1001 (“[L]ittle consideration seems to have been given to
the conceptual differences between supervised release and probation,” and “[t]he adoption of the
revocation mechanism did not even warrant a separate header to draw attention to the change.”).
116. Id. at 1001–02; see also Vincent, supra note 10, at 188 (adding revocation mechanism
because “without a realistic threat of reincarceration, some offenders would violate the conditions
of supervised release with impunity”).
117. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 49–50 (2003), as reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683.
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D3.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1987).
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whenever they sentence a defendant to more than one year in prison,
and “may” impose supervised release “in any other case.”119 Every
subsequent edition of the Guidelines has featured this same
instruction, with the only exception being for defendants who are
“deportable alien[s]” and thus “likely [to] be deported after
imprisonment.”120 The Commission also adopted a highly punitive
view of revocation, instructing that courts should aim to “sanction
primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to
a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the
criminal history of the violator.”121
The cumulative effect of these changes has made supervised
release into a more expansive, more rigid, and more punitive system.
District judges now impose supervised release in 99 percent of eligible
cases, with the average term lasting forty-one months (not counting
those sentenced to lifetime supervised release).122 In 2015, the number
of people on supervised release hit an all-time high of 115,000—five
times more than were under parole.123 Revocations have also become
more common,124 and more than half of all revocations are for noncriminal conduct.125 One-third of all defendants are eventually found
in violation of a condition of their release, with the average revocation
sentence lasting eleven months.126 In 2009, over 10,000 people were
in federal prison for violating their supervised release,127 which was
between 5 and 10 percent of the total federal prison population.128
While Congress intended supervised release to reduce government
119. Id.
120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
Nonetheless, over 90 percent of non-citizen defendants are still sentenced to supervised release.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 60
(2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf.
121. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
122. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, at 49–50.
123. See Schuman, supra note 6; PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 5.
124. See Whiteside, supra note 10, at 211 (“Approximately one-half of the districts report that
there are more revocation actions than in the past . . . .”).
125. Doherty, supra note 10, at 1016. The Sentencing Guidelines suggest a long list of
conditions of release. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018). Judge Richard Posner counted ten “mandatory” conditions of release, fourteen
“standard” conditions, and thirteen “special” or “additional” conditions. United States v.
Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 372–73 (7th Cir. 2015).
126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, at 63.
127. Id. at 69.
128. Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_
statistics.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
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interference in the lives of former prisoners, it instead has become a
system of mass supervision.
III. CASELAW ON PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE
Given the important role of supervised release in the federal
criminal justice system, the constitutional law of community
supervision has not received the attention it deserves. In the 1970s, the
Supreme Court issued a series of three decisions defining the
constitutional rights of parolees, affording them limited procedural
protections before their release could be revoked.129 But after
Congress abolished parole and created supervised release in 1984, the
Court spent thirty years without addressing this new system.
Meanwhile, the courts of appeals unanimously concluded that the two
systems were not meaningfully different and therefore governed by
the same minimal standard of due process. Last term in United States
v. Haymond, the Supreme Court issued its first major decision on the
constitutional law of supervised release, recognizing at least one
important difference between the two systems, and striking down a
provision of the supervised release statute as violating the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.130
A. Supreme Court’s Parole Decisions
Parole has a long history in the United States, but the Supreme
Court did not decide a major case on parole revocation until the 1970s,
when it issued a series of three decisions defining the limited
constitutional rights of parolees.131 Emphasizing the system’s
administrative and rehabilitative nature, the Court held that parole
revocation was governed by a minimal standard of process under the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, with no other protections
under the Bill of Rights.
129. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 79 (1976); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–
91 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487–89 (1972).
130. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019).
131. A fourth decision, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979), held that prisoners had “no constitutional or inherent right” to be granted parole and
therefore no right to due process in such decisions. Id. at 7–8. Just like the parole revocation
decisions, Greenholtz emphasized the system’s rehabilitative and administrative features, which
“differ[ed] from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the choice involve[d] a
synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the
decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate
and for the community.” Id. at 8.
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The Supreme Court’s first and most important decision on parole
revocation was Morrissey v. Brewer132 in 1972, which held that
parolees had a limited right to due process before their release could
be revoked.133 Because “revocation of parole is not part of a criminal
prosecution,” the Court explained, “the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such a proceeding does not apply.”134
In excluding parole revocation from the Bill of Rights, the Court
emphasized the unique “function of parole in the correctional
process.”135 Parole was a grant of early release from prison “on the
condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of
the sentence,” with a goal of “help[ing] individuals reintegrate into
society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able.”136 Parole
supervision was “not directly by the court but by an administrative
agency.”137 These features of parole revocation differed
fundamentally from criminal prosecution, and therefore the ordinary
trial rights did not apply.138
To determine the minimum procedural standards for parole
revocation, the Court balanced the interests at stake.139 First, the
“liberty of the parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the
core values of unqualified liberty,” and therefore was “valuable and
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
requiring “some orderly process, however informal.”140 That liberty
interest was diminished, however, because the parolee did not enjoy
“the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,” but only a
“conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
parole restrictions.”141 For its part, the state had an “overwhelming
interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without
the burden of a new adversary criminal trial,” because it had found the
parolee guilty of a crime, yet agreed to release him “with the
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not
132. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
133. Id. at 480.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 477.
136. Id. The Court also noted that parole “serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an
individual in prison.” Id.
137. Id. at 480.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 481–84.
140. Id. at 482.
141. Id. at 480.
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be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial
acts.”142 Finally, “[s]ociety has a stake in whatever may be the chance
of restoring [the parolee] to normal and useful life within the law,” as
well as “in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in
parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation.”143
In light of this balancing analysis, the Court concluded that
parolees had the right to a revocation hearing “within a reasonable
time” after being “taken into custody,” where they should have “an
opportunity to be heard,” to present evidence, and to argue against
revocation.144 Although the Court would not “write a code of
procedure” for these proceedings, it did set forth “the minimum
requirements of due process”145 as follows:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);
(e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be
judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.146
These rules were later formalized for federal parole and probation
revocations in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.147
The Supreme Court’s second major decision on parole revocation
came the next year in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,148 which held that parolees
had no absolute right to appointed counsel, but rather should be

142. Id. at 483.
143. Id. at 484.
144. Id. at 488.
145. Id. at 488–89.
146. Id.
147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 (advisory committee’s note to 1979 addition); see also United States
v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.
Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), the Supreme Court held that probationers were entitled to
the due process rights provided to parolees, as outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92
S. Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). These rights are codified in Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.”).
148. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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assigned attorneys on a “case-by-case basis.”149 The opinion “dr[e]w
heavily on the opinion in Morrissey,”150 and indeed adopted the same
basic logic: because parole was rehabilitative and administrative,
revocation was subject to a reduced standard of due process.
The Court explained that parole’s primary purpose was “to help
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon
as they are able.”151 Parole officers, animated “by and large” with
“concern for the client,” were “entrusted traditionally with broad
discretion to judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases,
and . . . armed with the power to recommend or even to declare
revocation.”152 A revocation hearing was not like a “criminal trial,”
because “the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole
officer.”153 Appointing counsel to the parolee would “alter
significantly the nature of the proceeding,” since “the State in turn will
normally provide its own counsel” and “lawyers, by training and
disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present
all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients’
positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views.”154
Ultimately, “[t]he role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in
Morrissey as being ‘predictive and discretionary’” would become
“more akin to that of a judge at a trial . . . less attuned to the
rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee.”155
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that Morrissey promised
limited procedural rights to parolees and that “the effectiveness of
the[se] rights may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills”
that “the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess.”156 “In some
cases,” the Court noted, “the probationer[] or parolee[] . . . can fairly
be represented only by a trained advocate.”157 But because “due
process is not so rigid as to require that . . . informality, flexibility, and
economy must always be sacrificed,” the Court rejected “a new
149. Gagnon formally addressed probation, not parole, but the Court found no “difference
relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of
probation.” Id. at 782, 790.
150. Id. at 783.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 784 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477).
153. Id. at 789.
154. Id. at 787.
155. Id. at 787–88.
156. Id. at 786–87.
157. Id. at 788.
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inflexible rule with respect to the requirement of counsel,” and instead
concluded “that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made
on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the
state authority.”158
The Supreme Court’s third and final decision on parole
revocation came three years later in Moody v. Daggett,159 which
addressed the right to a timely revocation hearing.160 The petitioner
there was a federal prisoner convicted of rape on an Indian reservation
and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, for which he served four
before being released on parole.161 He then shot and killed two people
on the reservation, was convicted of homicide in federal court, and
sentenced to another ten years’ imprisonment.162 Committing those
homicides also obviously violated the conditions of his parole, so the
Parole Commission issued “a parole violator warrant” against him,
which it lodged with prison officials as a detainer.163 The petitioner
then asked the Commission to “execute the warrant immediately so
that any imprisonment imposed for violation of his earlier parole under
the rape conviction could run concurrently with his . . . homicide
sentences.”164 The Commission refused, saying that “it intended to
execute the warrant only upon [his] release from his second
sentence.”165 In response, the petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus
action challenging the Commission’s refusal to execute the warrant.
The Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding that a
parolee was not “constitutionally entitled to a prompt parole
revocation hearing when a parole violator warrant is issued and lodged
with the institution of his confinement.”166 The Court acknowledged
that under Morrissey, the parolee had the right to a revocation hearing
“within a reasonable time after [he] is taken into custody.”167 But
158. Id. at 788, 790. The Court added that appointed counsel should be “[p]resumptively”
required when the parolee made “a timely and colorable claim” that he had not committed the
alleged violation or had “substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation or make
revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or
present.” Id.
159. 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
160. Id. (holding that issuance of parole violator warrant is not per se deprivation of rights).
161. Id. at 80.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 80–81.
165. Id. at 81.
166. Id. at 79.
167. Id. at 87 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)).
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because the petitioner was currently incarcerated for the homicide
convictions, not the parole violation, the Court concluded that
deferring the hearing did him no harm, and he had no right to object
to the delay.168
The Court specifically rejected the petitioner’s argument that
delaying the revocation hearing would harm him by denying him the
“opportunity” to serve his sentence for the parole violation
concurrently with his sentence for the homicide convictions.169 Under
the parole regulations, the Court noted, the Commission “ha[d] power
to grant, retroactively, the equivalent or concurrent sentences and to
provide for unconditional or conditional release upon completion of
the subsequent sentence.”170 Therefore, “deferral of the revocation
decision does not deprive petitioner of any such opportunity.”171
“Finally,” the Court said, there was the “practical aspect to
consider.”172 Because the petitioner had pled guilty to two homicides,
he also had obviously violated the conditions of his parole, and “the
only remaining inquiry is whether continued release is justified
notwithstanding the violation.”173 Since this decision was “uniquely a
‘prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without
committing antisocial acts,’” his “institutional record” was “perhaps
one of the most significant factors.”174 “Given the predictive nature of
the hearing,” the Court concluded, it made sense to delay it until the
petitioner finished his current sentence, at which point that
“prediction” would be “both most relevant and most accurate.”175
B. Supreme Court’s Silence on Supervised Release
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, abolishing
parole and creating supervised release. Yet between 1984 and 2019,
the Supreme Court said almost nothing about how this new system of
post-release supervision fit into the nation’s constitutional framework.
During this time, the Court issued only three minor opinions touching
supervised release, all involving technical issues of statutory
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
Id.
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interpretation.176 The little the Court did say about supervised release
suggested that it served the same rehabilitative function as parole and
therefore should be analyzed in the same manner.
The Court’s 1991 decision in Gozlon-Peretz v. United States177
addressed how supervised release should apply to defendants who
committed their offenses between 1986 (when Congress imposed
mandatory minimum terms of supervised release for drug offenses)
and 1987 (when the Sentencing Reform Act actually took effect).178
Based on the statutory text, the Justices concluded that these interim
offenders should be subject to the mandatory terms of supervised
release.179 The decision turned entirely on a close reading of the
statutes and said virtually nothing about supervised release, though it
did note that in contrast to parole, “the sentencing court, rather than
the Parole Commission, . . . oversee[s] the defendant’s postconfinement monitoring.”180 The opinion also noted cryptically that
“[s]upervised release is a unique method of post-confinement
supervision invented by Congress for a series of sentencing
reforms.”181
In United States v. Johnson,182 decided in 2000, the Supreme
Court suggested a rehabilitative view of supervised release.183 The
question there was whether a defendant who had over-served a prison
sentence could have his term of supervised release shortened based on
the excess time he spent in prison.184 Once again relying solely on the
statutory language, the Court unanimously held that the answer was
no—the defendant had to serve his full term of supervised release
beginning on the date he actually left prison.185 Although the Court
found that “the text of [the statute] resolves the case,” it also noted that
this “conclusion accord[ed] with the statute’s purpose and design.”186
“Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those

176. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53
(2000); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395 (1991).
177. 498 U.S. 395 (1991).
178. Id. at 408–09.
179. Id. at 399–410.
180. Id. at 400–01.
181. Id. at 407–08.
182. 529 U.S. 53 (2000).
183. Id. at 53–54.
184. Id. at 54.
185. Id. at 56–59.
186. Id. at 59.
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served by incarceration,” the Court said, so it would make no sense to
“treat[] [a defendant’s] time in prison as interchangeable with his term
of supervised release.”187
Finally, in the similarly titled Johnson v. United States188 decided
the same year, the Supreme Court gave its fullest view to date of
supervised release, comparing the system to parole over a strong
dissent.189 This case asked whether a 1994 amendment empowering
judges to impose additional terms of supervised release on defendants
who had violated their initial terms of supervision applied
retroactively.190 The Court again relied primarily on a textual analysis,
holding that regardless of the amendment, pre-1994 statutory language
permitted judges to impose the additional terms of supervision.191
Having resolved the statutory question, the Supreme Court added
that there was “nothing surprising about the consequences of our
reading,” since it “serv[ed] the evident congressional purpose . . . in
providing for a term of supervised release.”192 Supervised release was
designed to “improve the odds of a successful transition from the
prison to liberty,” and therefore judges should be able to impose
additional terms of supervision on those offenders who needed it.193
The Court also noted that supervised release was “closely analogous”
to parole, and that it was consistent with parole practice to impose
additional supervision on prisoners after their release was revoked.194
Justice Scalia dissented, primarily disagreeing with the majority’s
statutory analysis, but also criticizing its analogy to parole.195
Observing that “the Sentencing Reform Act’s adoption of supervised
release was meant to make a significant break with prior practice,”196
he found “the Court’s effort to equate parole and supervised
release . . . unpersuasive.”197 “Unlike parole, which replaced a portion
of a defendant’s prison sentence,” he observed, “supervised release is
187. Id. at 59–60.
188. 529 U.S. 694 (2000).
189. Id. (holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release
following reimprisonment).
190. Id. at 696–98.
191. Id. at 701–08.
192. Id. at 708–10.
193. Id. at 708–09.
194. Id. at 710–11.
195. Id. at 715–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 724–25.
197. Id. at 725.
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a separate term imposed at the time of initial sentencing.”198
Ultimately, however, he did not appear particularly invested in this
distinction, concluding that “[t]his is not an important case, since it
deals with the interpretation of a statute that has been amended to
eliminate, for the future, the issue we today resolve.”199
C. Circuit Courts’ Application of Parole Precedents
to Supervised Release
Without Supreme Court guidance, the courts of appeals
unanimously concluded that supervised release was merely a
continuation of the old parole system and therefore governed by the
old parole precedents. Many circuit courts simply applied the Supreme
Court’s parole precedents to supervised release without analysis.200
Others specifically held that “[p]arole, probation, and supervised
release revocation hearings are constitutionally indistinguishable” and
therefore “analyzed in the same manner.”201 Citing Morrissey,
Gagnon, and Moody, the circuit courts concluded that defendants
facing revocation of their supervised release were entitled to the same
minimal standard of due process as parolees.
The Fourth Circuit’s 1992 decision in United States v. Copley202
is an early example. There, the defendant argued that the district court
had violated his right to due process by failing to provide him with an
198. Id.
199. Id. at 727.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 852 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he due process
guarantees associated with [supervised release] proceedings are ‘minimal.’” (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485, 489 (1972))); United States v. Sistrunk, 612 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
2010) (“When a person is charged with violating a condition of supervised release, he is entitled to
minimal due process rights prior to revocation of supervised release.” (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 480–82)); United States v. Gomez-Gonzalez, 277 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Morrissey
due process requirements also apply to revocations of supervised release. . . . Like parole . . . fewer
constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the conditional liberty interest during supervised
release.”); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[M]ost of the fundamental
constitutional procedural protections that are normally applicable to a criminal prosecution are not
required for supervised-release proceedings as a matter of constitutional law.” (citing Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973))); United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“In Morrissey v. Brewer . . . the Supreme Court defined certain minimal due process requirements
for parole revocation. . . . supervised release revocation[] incorporates these same minimal due
process requisites.”).
201. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he same protections granted those facing
revocation of parole are required for those facing the revocation of supervised release.”); United
States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 414 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).
202. 978 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1992).
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adequate written explanation of why it had revoked his supervised
release.203 The court of appeals disagreed, citing the reduced
constitutional protections for parole revocation under Gagnon and
Morrissey, and holding that “[l]ogic would extend this protection to
hearings to revoke supervised release,” since “[s]upervised release and
probation differ only in that the former follows a prison term and the
latter is in lieu of a prison term.”204 Other circuit courts later cited this
case for the proposition that “[t]he same protections granted those
facing revocation of parole are required for those facing the revocation
of supervised release.”205
Fifteen years later in United States v. Carlton,206 the Second
Circuit applied similar reasoning to hold that defendants facing
revocation of supervised release had no right to a jury or proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.207 The defendant there challenged the
constitutionality of the supervised release system on the ground that
“it empower[ed] a district court to revoke his term of supervised
release without a jury trial and based on findings that are not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of his constitutional rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”208 The court of appeals
rejected this argument by citing Gagnon and Morrissey and explaining
that “the ‘full panoply of rights’ due a defendant in a criminal
prosecution does not apply to revocation hearings for parole . . . or for
supervised release, [both] of which are virtually indistinguishable for
purposes of due process analysis.”209

203. Id. at 831.
204. Id. at 831 & n.*.
205. Copeland, 20 F.3d at 414 (citing Copley, 978 F.2d at 831); see also McCormick, 54 F.3d
at 221 (“[T]he same protections granted those facing revocation of parole are required for those
facing the revocation of supervised release.” (citing Copeland, 20 F.3d at 414)).
206. 442 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 2006).
207. Id. at 810.
208. Id. at 807. This case was similar to Haymond but with one significant difference—the
district court was not required to impose a mandatory minimum revocation sentence. See United
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2383–84 (2019) (“As we have emphasized, our decision is
limited to § 3583(k)—an unusual provision enacted little more than a decade ago—and the Alleyne
problem raised by its five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. . . . Section 3583(e),
which governs supervised release revocation proceedings generally, does not contain any similar
mandatory minimum triggered by judge-found facts.”).
209. Carlton, 442 F.3d at 807 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Gavilanes-Ocaranza,
772 F.3d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[R]evocation of supervised release [and] revocation of
parole . . . must be analyzed the same way when we consider Sixth Amendment . . . trial by jury
claims.”).
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In myriad other cases, circuit courts have analogized supervised
release to parole in order to deny defendants’ constitutional rights. The
Fifth Circuit applied Morrissey to hold that defendants facing
revocation of their supervised release had no rights under the
Confrontation Clause, because “[i]n determining the scope of the right
to confrontation at revocation hearings, we follow Supreme Court
precedent addressing that right in the similar context of parole
proceedings.”210 The Eleventh Circuit quoted Morrissey in holding
that a district court had not violated due process by failing to give a
defendant notice that it would hold ambiguous drug tests against him,
saying the court did nothing wrong by “engag[ing] in the ‘predictive
and discretionary’ task of revocation sentencing . . . by referencing
without prior notice conduct that . . . was ‘part of [the defendant’s]
behavior while on’ supervised release.”211 Even when deciding in
favor of a defendant in an Ex Post Facto case, the Ninth Circuit noted
that “[s]upervised release and parole are virtually identical systems.
Under each, a defendant serves a portion of a sentence in prison and a
portion under supervision outside prison walls. If a defendant violates
the terms of his release, he may be incarcerated once more.”212
Not only have the courts of appeals applied parole precedents to
supervised release, they have also affirmatively rejected arguments
attempting to distinguish between them. In United States v. Frazier,213
the Eleventh Circuit held that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not
210. United States v. Jimison, 825 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2016); see also United States v.
Reese, 775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding there is no right to confrontation in
supervised release revocation because “courts treat revocations the same whether they involve
probation, parole, or supervised release”); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Morrissey held that due process requires a flexible notice-and-hearing procedure—
including a limited right of confrontation—in the revocation context.” (citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 488–90 (1972))); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because
‘[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,
but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions’
the full protection provided to criminal defendants, including the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, does not apply to them.” (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480)).
211. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 480).
212. United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We conclude that for purposes of analyzing the
applicable constitutional protections, a charge of supervised-release violation is virtually
indistinguishable from a charge of violation of parole.”); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523,
526 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992) (“We can find no persuasive reason to distinguish between the standards of
parole eligibility . . . and the conditions for revocation of supervised release, at issue in the present
case.”).
213. 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994).
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apply to supervised release because they did not apply to parole, and
the two systems were “conceptually the same.”214 The court rebuffed
the defendant’s argument that parole differed from supervised release
because it was “granted as a matter of grace, and w[as] not supervised
by the judicial branch, whereas supervised release is mandatory and is
administered by the court.”215 “Although the administration of
supervised release is somewhat different than that of . . . parole,” the
court noted, “the purpose and theory of [both] types of release are
essentially identical.”216
The Fourth Circuit similarly denied any distinction between the
two systems in United States v. Armstrong,217 holding that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to supervised release revocations
because it did not apply to parole.218 The court firmly rejected the
defendant’s attempt to differentiate supervised release from parole,
declaring that “parole and supervised release are not just analogous,
but virtually indistinguishable.”219 “Although supervised release
revocation proceedings, unlike parole revocation hearings, do take
place before a judge,” the court noted, “they are characterized by the
same ‘flexibility’” as parole hearings.220
Despite this overwhelming consensus, it is worth noting that a
few judges have reached a different conclusion about the relationship
between parole and supervised release. In his Johnson dissent, Justice
Scalia stressed the “break” that occurred when Congress replaced
parole with supervised release,221 and Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit emphasized their differences in a decision criticizing “judicial
insouciance” in the imposition of supervised release.222 He reasoned:
Parole shortens prison time, substituting restrictions on the
freed prisoner. Supervised release does not shorten prison
time; instead it imposes restrictions on the prisoner to take
effect upon his release from prison. Parole mitigates
punishment; supervised release augments it—most
214. Id. at 113.
215. Id. at 113 n.2.
216. Id.
217. 187 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1999).
218. Id. at 393 (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998)).
219. Id. at 394.
220. Id.
221. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 724–25 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.); see also United
States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.).
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dramatically when the defendant, having been determined to
have violated a condition or conditions of supervised release,
is given, as punishment, a fresh term of imprisonment.223
While a few other judges have also pointed out differences between
supervised release and parole, these observations have not made any
impact in the realm of constitutional law.224 Indeed, despite Judge
Posner’s decisions, the rule in the Seventh Circuit remains that
“Morrissey . . . sets out the due process requirements for purposes of
supervised release revocation hearings.”225
D. Supreme Court Breaks Its Silence on Supervised Release
The Supreme Court finally broke its long silence on supervised
release in 2019 with a 4–1–4 decision in United States v. Haymond.226
Fractured into a four-vote plurality and a single-Justice concurrence,
a majority of the Court concluded that one provision of the supervised
release statute violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.227 Although all the Justices acknowledged that
supervised release differed from parole insofar as it added to the
sentence rather than reducing it, they disagreed vigorously about the
constitutional significance of this distinction.228
Haymond concerned the constitutionality of section 3583(k), title
18 of the United States Code, a provision of the supervised release
statute enacted in 2003 that imposed a five-year minimum sentence on
sex offenders who violated their supervised release by committing
another sex offense.229 The petitioner had been convicted of
possessing child pornography and sentenced to thirty-eight months’

223. Thompson, 777 F.3d. at 372.
224. See United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); see also
United States v. King, 891 F.3d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 2018).
225. United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 435 (7th Cir. 2008).
226. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (holding “federal statute governing
revocation of supervised release, authorizing a new mandatory minimum sentence based on a
judge’s fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence, violated the Due Process Clause and the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, as applied”). The Supreme Court also issued another technical
decision on supervised release, holding that a term of supervision is tolled while a defendant is held
in pretrial detention for a new criminal offense, so long as he later receives credit for that period of
detention as time served on the new offense. See Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019)
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)).
227. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382.
228. Id. at 2379, 2386.
229. Id. at 2374.
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imprisonment followed by ten years’ supervised release.230 He
completed his prison sentence and began his term of supervision, but
was eventually found with more child pornography on his computers
and cellphone.231 The government sought to revoke his supervised
release and send him back to prison.232 At the revocation hearing, the
district court concluded “under a preponderance of the evidence rather
than a reasonable doubt standard” that the defendant had knowingly
downloaded and possessed thirteen of the images, but found
“insufficient evidence” to show that he had knowingly accessed the
remaining forty-six images.233 The court described the five-year
minimum sentence as excessive and even “repugnant,” but was
compelled to impose it on the defendant, stating that “[w]ere it not for
[the] mandatory minimum . . . he ‘probably would have sentenced in
the range of two years or less.’”234
The Supreme Court held that the five-year mandatory minimum
violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.235 The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Gorsuch, described
this conclusion as a “clear” application of the Court’s prior decisions
in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States.236 Apprendi
held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”237 Alleyne extended this rule to facts that
increased the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.238 Section
3583(k) violated Apprendi and Alleyne, because it allowed “judicial
factfinding” to “trigger[] a new punishment in the form of a prison
term of at least five years and up to life.”239
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Gorsuch specifically rejected
the government’s argument that “[section] 3583(k)’s supervised
release revocation procedures are practically identical to historic
parole and probation revocation procedures,” which Morrissey and

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 2373.
Id. at 2374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2375.
See id. at 2378–79; id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2381.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 112 (2013).
Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2378 (plurality opinion) (citing Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115).
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Gagnon found “to comport with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”240
That comparison, he said, “overlook[ed] a critical difference between
[section] 3583(k) and traditional parole and probation practices.”241
Under parole, the defendant was released early from his prison
sentence, and if he violated a condition, was sent back to prison “to
serve only the remaining prison term authorized by statute for his
original crime of conviction.”242 But “[a]ll that changed beginning in
1984” when “Congress overhauled federal sentencing procedures to
make prison terms more determinate and abolish the practice of
parole.”243 Now, the defendant must serve his prison sentence in full,
followed by a term of supervised release “to encourage rehabilitation
after the completion” of the prison term.244
This difference “bears constitutional consequences,” Justice
Gorsuch explained, because parole violations “generally exposed a
defendant only to the remaining prison term authorized for his crime
of conviction,” while supervised release violations may “expose a
defendant to an additional . . . prison term well beyond that authorized
by the jury’s verdict.”245 Furthermore, he noted, section 3583(k)
“differs . . . not only from parole and probation,” but also “from the
supervised release practices that . . . govern most federal criminal
proceedings today,” since “[u]nlike all those procedures, [section]
3583(k) alone requires a substantial increase in the minimum sentence
to which a defendant may be exposed.”246 Therefore, section 3583(k),
“offends the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ ancient protections,” while
parole revocation did not.247
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. He opposed applying
Apprendi to supervised release because of “potentially destabilizing
consequences.”248 Nevertheless, he concluded that section 3583(k)
violated the right to a jury trial because it functioned “less like
ordinary revocation and more like punishment for a new offense” by
targeting a “discrete set of federal criminal offenses” and “imposing a
240. Id. at 2381 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972)).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2382.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”249 Justice Breyer
emphasized, however, that parole and supervised release revocations
were otherwise comparable, asserting that “the role of the judge in a
supervised-release proceeding is consistent with traditional parole”
and “Congress did not intend the system of supervised release to differ
from parole in this respect.”250
Justice Alito dissented, castigating the plurality opinion as “not
based on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment . . .
irreconcilable with precedent, and sport[ing] rhetoric with potentially
revolutionary implications.”251 Based on a lengthy historical and
linguistic analysis of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, he
concluded that supervised release revocation was not a “criminal
prosecution” and therefore Apprendi and Alleyne did not apply.252
Justice Alito also disputed the plurality’s distinction between
parole and supervised release. While he acknowledged that parole cut
short a prison sentence and supervised release adds to it, he insisted
that “this difference is purely formal and should have no constitutional
consequences.”253 Far from distinctive, he suggested, supervised
release is the “substantive equivalent” of parole.254
Here is an example: A pre-SRA sentence of nine years’
imprisonment meant three years of certain confinement and
six years of possible confinement depending on the
defendant’s conduct in the outside world after release from
prison. At least for present purposes, such a sentence is the
substantive equivalent of a post-SRA sentence of three years’
imprisonment followed by six years of supervised release. In
both situations, the period of certain confinement (three
years) and the maximum term of possible confinement (nine
years) are the same.255
“Once this is understood,” Justice Alito concluded, “it follows that the
procedures that must be followed at a supervised-release revocation
proceeding are the same that had to be followed at a parole revocation

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 2386.
Id. at 2385.
Id. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2392–2400.
Id. at 2388.
Id. at 2390.
Id.
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proceeding, and these were settled long ago” in Gagnon and
Morrissey.256
IV. SUPERVISED RELEASE IS NOT PAROLE
Haymond marks the first time the Supreme Court recognized a
distinction between parole and supervised release: parole shortened
prison time, whereas supervised release is imposed in addition to a
prison sentence.257 The Justices disagreed sharply about the
constitutional significance of this distinction, but compared to past
precedents, their opinions still offer a clearer view of the relationship
between parole and supervised release. Nevertheless, the Justices also
overlooked other important distinctions between parole and
supervised release, which have significant consequences for the
constitutional law of community supervision. In fact, there are three
important differences between parole and supervised release:
• Parole was a relief from punishment, while supervised
release is an additional penalty.
• Parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised
release revocation is punitive.
• Parole was run by an administrative agency, while
supervised release is controlled by district courts.
Because of these differences, the Supreme Court’s parole
revocation precedents do not apply to supervised release. Instead,
defendants on supervised release deserve more procedural protections
before their release is revoked.
A. Relief Versus Penalty
The clearest difference between parole and supervised release is
that parole was a relief from punishment, whereas supervised release
is an additional penalty. Justice Gorsuch noted in Haymond that
“unlike parole, supervised release wasn’t introduced to replace a
portion of the defendant’s prison term,” but rather to run “after the
completion of his prison term.”258 Justice Alito also recognized this
distinction, although he said it was “purely formal and should have no
256. Id. at 2391 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972) and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973)).
257. Years before Haymond, Justice Scalia made the same observation in dissent. See Johnson
v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 725 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382 (plurality opinion).
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constitutional consequences.”259 But because the Justices focused on
the technical application of the Apprendi rule, they did not consider
how this difference affected the broader due-process balancing
analysis from Morrissey. Because the balance of interests under
supervised release favors defendants rather than the government,
defendants deserve more procedural protections than parolees before
their release is revoked.
Morrissey’s balancing of interests for parole revocations
depended on parole’s unique nature as a relief from punishment. The
Court described parole supervision fundamentally as an exchange
between the government and the parolee⎯the government gave the
parolee an enormous benefit by releasing him early from an otherwise
lawful prison sentence, and in return, the parolee promised to comply
with “many restrictions not applicable to other citizens.”260 Despite
those restrictions, this bargain substantially benefited the parolee,
“enabl[ing] him to do a wide range of things open to persons who have
never been convicted of any crime.”261 Because the government had
taken a “risk” by releasing the parolee early, it had an “overwhelming
interest” in being able to revoke his parole without a full criminal
trial.262 And because the parolee’s liberty was “properly dependent on
observance of special parole restrictions,” he had a weaker interest in
fighting revocation.263
But this logic does not translate to supervised release. Because
the defendant is no longer granted early release from prison, the term
of post-release supervision no longer reflects an exchange between
him and the government. Instead, the defendant must serve his prison
term in full, followed by an additional term of supervised release. The
government takes no “risk,” because it does not release the defendant
early, and the defendant’s freedom is not granted to him “dependent
on observance of special parole restrictions,” but rather earned after
full service of a prison sentence.264 This difference shifts the balance
of interests between the defendant and the government, giving the
defendant a stronger interest in fighting revocation, and the
government a weaker interest in avoiding a full criminal trial.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 2388 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 480.
Id.
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Indeed, as District Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York has observed, using the word “revoke” in reference to
supervised release is “somewhat of a misnomer.”265 He explained:
Parole was based on early release from prison—by the grace
of the parole board a person was conditionally released from
prison, and the leniency could be “revoked.” A person on
supervised release has completed his or her prison term and
is serving an independent term of supervision separately
ordered by the court. Supervised release is not being
“revoked”; rather, a supervisee is being punished for
violating conditions.266
Justice Kavanaugh put it similarly at the Haymond oral argument:
“Revocation of parole seems to me seems like a denied benefit,
whereas revocation of supervised release seems like a penalty.”267
Another way the relief/penalty distinction affects the
constitutional analysis is in changing the timing of when conditions of
release are imposed. The Parole Commission set parole conditions at
the same time that it released the parolee from prison, using his
institutional record as “one of the most significant factors” in its
decision.268 Parole violations were therefore considered a sign that the
defendant was “not adjusting properly and [could not] be counted on
to avoid antisocial activity.”269
Conditions of supervised release, by contrast, are imposed by the
district judge at sentencing—before the defendant begins the prison
term, and long before he will return to the community. Therefore, the
judge must “guess at the time of sentencing what conditions are likely
to make sense in what may be the distant future.”270 As a result, “many
district judges simply list the conditions that they impose, devoting
265. United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
266. Id. at 346–47.
267. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019)
(No. 17-1672).
268. Moody v. Daggert, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (“The behavior record of an inmate during confinement
is critical in the sense that it reflects the degree to which the inmate is prepared to adjust to parole
release.”).
269. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479.
270. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2015). While conditions of release
can be changed after imposition, “modification is a bother for the judge, especially when, as must
be common in cases involving very long sentences, modification becomes the responsibility of the
sentencing judge’s successor.” United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner,
J.).
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little or no time at sentencing to explaining them or justifying their
imposition.”271 The empirical evidence shows that in most cases,
judges are not “making any reasoned prediction, and instead are
simply putting everybody on supervised release,” imposing conditions
“without any apparent consideration of either an individual’s risk to
public safety or his or her rehabilitation needs.”272
Because supervised release conditions are imposed without the
same reflection or evidentiary foundation as parole conditions,
violations are less likely to be warning signs of antisocial conduct.
Technical violations in particular—missed appointments, positive
drug tests, breached curfews, etc.273—are not necessarily signs that the
defendant is failing to adjust to the community. These conditions are
selected long before the defendant’s release from prison, without a
fully informed judgment of what is necessary to ensure a successful
return to the community. The government therefore has a weaker
interest in punishing supervised release violations, and the defendant
a stronger claim to his liberty.
B. Rehabilitation Versus Punishment
Another important difference between parole and supervised
release is that parole revocation was rehabilitative, while supervised
release revocation is punitive. None of the opinions in Haymond
recognized this distinction, with the plurality asserting that supervised
release serves to “encourage rehabilitation,”274 and the dissent
claiming that it ensures defendants are “sufficiently reformed” and
“able to lead a law-abiding life.”275 The circuit courts have similarly
applied parole precedents to supervised release by emphasizing their
shared rehabilitative character,276 citing the legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act as evidence that supervised release “fulfills
rehabilitative ends.”277 In reality, however, supervised release
271. Thompson, 777 F.3d at 373.
272. Scott-Hayward, supra note 10, at 183, 216.
273. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(a)(4) & (7), (c)(1)–(6), (d)(4) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
274. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2019).
275. Id. at 2389 (Alito, J., dissenting).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 711 F.3d 174, 177–78 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v.
Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Engelhorn, 122 F.3d 508, 511 (8th
Cir. 1997).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Congress intended supervised
release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills
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revocation is far more punitive than parole revocation, entitling
defendants to more procedural protections before their release is
revoked.
On the most basic level, parole encouraged rehabilitation by
promising to reduce punishment, while supervised release does not.
From the beginnings of Maconochie’s mark system, the promise of
early release was meant to reform criminal offenders by encouraging
their good behavior. Supervised release, however, is added to a prison
sentence, not deducted from it. No matter how the prisoner behaves,
he will have to serve his term of imprisonment in full, followed by his
term of supervised release.
More broadly, parole revocation was governed by a rehabilitative
theory of punishment, which supervised release revocation officially
excludes. Parole was rooted in a “medical” theory of imprisonment
that viewed offenders as “sick” and needing to be “cured” through
incarceration.278 Parole conditions were meant to guide the parolee’s
“restoration . . . into normal society,”279 with violations signaling that
the parolee was “not adjusting properly”280 and needed more
“treatment” in prison.281 Yet the Sentencing Reform Act rejected the
medical model of imprisonment, instructing district judges to
“consider the specified rationales of punishment except for
rehabilitation,” which they must “acknowledge as an unsuitable
justification for a prison term.”282 While the Parole Commission based
revocation decisions on rehabilitative concerns, judges are
affirmatively prohibited from taking these considerations into account
when they revoke supervised release.283
rehabilitative ends . . . . ‘[T]he primary goal of supervised release is to ease the defendant’s
transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious
offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for
punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release.’”
(quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983))); see also United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 252
(2d Cir. 2015) (quoting same); United States v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting
same).
278. Dershowitz, supra note 81, at 128.
279. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972).
280. Id. at 479.
281. Dershowitz, supra note 81, at 128.
282. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 327 (2011) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)).
Indeed, the Act did not even give courts the ability to ensure that the defendants they sentenced
received rehabilitative services in prison. Id. at 330.
283. Initially, this rule did not affect defendants on supervised release, because the Act did not
include a revocation mechanism. See Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204. In 1986, however,
Congress added a provision for revoking supervised release, and the circuit courts have since
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In addition to excluding rehabilitation, the circuit courts have also
held that judges should revoke supervised release for primarily
retributive reasons. Although the Sentencing Reform Act omitted “just
punishment” as a factor for judges to consider when revoking
supervised release,284 a majority of the courts have nevertheless
concluded that “consideration of the gravity of the violation of
supervised release . . . is not prohibited,” because the statute does not
expressly “foreclose a court from considering ‘other pertinent factors,’
such as . . . ‘the seriousness of the offense.’”285 Emphasizing a
punitive element that the statute itself omits, the courts now declare
that “revocation sentences are . . . intended to ‘sanction,’ or,
analogously, to ‘provide just punishment for the offense’ of violating
supervised release.”286 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Haymond
endorsed this view: “The consequences that flow from violation of the
conditions of supervised release are first and foremost considered
sanctions for the defendant’s . . . failure to follow the court-imposed
conditions.”287 The Sentencing Guidelines include the same
instruction, stating that courts should revoke supervised release to
“sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into
account . . . the seriousness of the underlying violation and the
criminal history of the violator.”288
unanimously concluded that the prohibition on considering rehabilitation also applies to revocation.
See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 690 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2013);
United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 657–59 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760,
765–67 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Taylor, 679 F.3d
1005, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 280–81 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 2–5 (1st Cir. 2011) (Souter, J., by designation).
284. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3583(e)(3) (2012).
285. United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
Phillips, 791 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641–42 (4th Cir.
2013); United States v. Vargas–Dávila, 649 F.3d 129, 131–32 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47–48 (2d Cir.
2006). But see United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011) (judge may not consider
punishment in revoking release); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1181–83 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“In sum, at a revocation sentencing, a court may appropriately sanction a violator for his ‘breach
of trust,’ but may not punish him for the criminal conduct underlying the revocation.”).
286. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400; see also Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 206 (“There is no
real distinction between what the [Sentencing] Commission calls the breach of trust and the
seriousness of the underlying violation. The releasee is punished for the new conduct with
additional time added on to reflect the criminal history.”).
287. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2386 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
288. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
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Finally, Congress made supervised release harsher and more
expansive through a series of amendments in the late 1980s, 1990s,
and 2000s. Although supervised release was originally designed to
provide transitional support only for defendants in need, courts now
impose a term of supervision in virtually all eligible cases.289 While
the system was supposed to ease return to the community, courts now
impose more conditions of release,290 revoke release more often, and
revoke release more frequently for technical infractions.291 “What was
originally designed to assist re-integration into the community,”
instead is “facilitating reincarceration.”292
The punishing character of supervised release revocation stands
in stark contrast to the rehabilitative logic underlying the Supreme
Court’s parole revocation precedents. Morrissey, Gagnon, and Moody
all repeatedly invoked parole’s beneficent purpose when limiting
parolees’ constitutional rights, stressing that the system had a
“rehabilitative rather than punitive focus.”293 Parole officials could be
trusted because “by and large concern for the client dominates [their]
professional attitude.”294 Parole revocations needed to be informal
because “[t]he objective is to return a prisoner to a full family and
community life,” and the inquiry was “not purely factual but also
predictive and discretionary.”295 And making parole revocations too
procedural would actually harm parolees by making the hearing “less
attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual.”296 Because
supervised release revocations exclude rehabilitative considerations
and instead focus on punishment, these justifications for reduced
constitutional protections do not apply. Defendants on supervised

289. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120, at 4, 49–50.
290. See Petersilia, supra note 49, at 507.
291. See Wooten, supra note 104, at 185; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 120,
at 68 (“[T]echnical violations accounted for the majority (51.6 percent) of all violations from 2005
to 2008.”); Doherty, supra note 10, at 1016 (“In any one year, roughly sixty percent of revocations
are for non-criminal conduct.”); Whiteside, supra note 10, at 211 (“Approximately one-half of the
districts report that there are more revocation actions than in the past.”).
292. Biderman & Sands, supra note 10, at 204.
293. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
294. Id. at 783–84.
295. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 495, 480 (1972); see also Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S.
78, 89 (1976) (requiring the Parole Commission to convene prompt revocation hearings would
impede its “prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without committing
antisocial acts”).
296. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88.
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release are therefore entitled to more procedural rights than parolees
before their release is revoked.
C. Agency Versus Courts
The third and final difference between parole and supervised
release is that parole was run by an agency—the Parole Commission—
while supervised release is controlled by district courts. The Supreme
Court acknowledged this distinction in Gozlon-Peretz, noting that “the
sentencing court, rather than the Parole Commission, . . . oversee[s]
the defendant’s postconfinement monitoring.”297 In his Haymond
concurrence, however, Justice Breyer made the surprising claim that
“the role of the judge in a supervised-release proceeding is consistent
with traditional parole” and “Congress did not intend the system of
supervised release to differ from parole in this respect.”298 That
comparison is hard to square with the significant differences between
the Parole Commission and district courts.299 While the Supreme
Court’s parole precedents emphasized the need for flexibility in
administrative hearings, judicial proceedings are more amenable to
protecting defendants’ procedural rights.
The Supreme Court strived to avoid adding procedural rules to
parole revocations because it feared that they would “alter
significantly the nature of the proceeding,” by changing “[t]he role of
the hearing body . . . [into] that of a judge at a trial.”300 The Court
warned that making revocation proceedings too procedural might
actually disadvantage the parolee, since “[i]n the greater selfconsciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the hearing body may be less
tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to
reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.”301
The Court also stressed that in a parole revocation, the
government was not represented by a prosecutor, but by a parole
officer, who “recognizes his double duty to the welfare of his clients
297. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991).
298. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2385 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring).
299. When a special study committee recommended in 1990 that jurisdiction over supervised
release be transferred to a specialized agency like the Parole Commission, the Judicial Conference
of the United States opposed the idea. Adair, supra note 10.
300. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (saying that parole decisions “[differ] from the traditional mold of judicial
decisionmaking in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation
filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker”).
301. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788.
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and to the safety of the general community,” and views revocation “as
a failure of supervision.”302 Because of this professional attitude, “he
has been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to judge” the
parolee and “armed with the power to recommend or even to declare
revocation.”303 The Court emphasized that “[c]ontrol over the required
proceedings by the hearing officers can assure that delaying tactics and
other abuses sometimes present in the traditional adversary trial
situation do not occur.”304
Supervised release revocations, by contrast, are held in district
court, and therefore by definition are before “a judge at a trial.”305
They are also deeply adversarial because the defendant has a statutory
right to counsel and the United States Attorney’s Office represents the
government.306 Indeed, federal prosecutors now play a prominent role
at revocation hearings:
At the hearing, the United States Attorney prosecutes the
petition, that is, calls witnesses and presents evidence in
support of the allegations of violation in the petitions. The
probation officer sits separately from the United States
Attorney, and her participation in the guilt-or-innocence
phase of the proceeding is limited to being a sworn witness,
if she is called either by the United States Attorney, the
defendant, or the court. At the hearing, the probation officer
makes no presentation or recommendation as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant; only the defendant or his
attorney and the United States Attorney argue the
defendant’s guilt or innocence.307
Unlike probation officers, federal prosecutors are trained to obtain
convictions and long sentences. They have no “duty” to the defendant
and do not view revocation as a “failure” of their own work.308
302. Id. at 783, 785 (quoting FRANK J. REMINGTON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION, MATERIALS & CASES, 910–11 (1969).
303. Id. at 784.
304. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489–90 (1972).
305. Cf. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88 (explaining that parole revocations require flexibility so
as not to turn the hearing body into “a judge at a trial”).
306. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(3)(B).
307. United States v. Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (M.D. Ala. 1997); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3603(8)(B) (2012) (requiring probation officers to report supervised-release violations “to the
Attorney General or his designee”).
308. Cf. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 783–85 (explaining that probation officers have a duty to their
clients and treat revocation as a failure of supervision).
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Revocation decisions are also no longer informed by the expert
judgment of the Parole Commission and its “administrative officers,”
to whom the Supreme Court gave “broad discretion.”309 Instead,
district judges make decisions to revoke supervised release based on
the recommendation of “a single probation officer,”310 who does not
disclose “the scientific basis (if there is a scientific basis) of his
recommendation . . . in his presentence report.”311 The role of the
probation office has changed as well, as a shrinking number of officers
have been asked to supervise more and more offenders,312 leading
them to “spend disproportionate time on enforcement (that is,
investigating violations . . . and recommending punishments)” with
“little time left over for suggesting appropriate conditions and helping
the probationer to comply with them.”313
Providing constitutional protections for defendants in these triallike proceedings will not “alter significantly the[ir] nature.”314 Given
the participation of United States Attorney’s Offices and district court
judges, these proceedings are already just as adversarial as criminal
trials, and defendants deserve similar constitutional rights. Indeed, as
Gagnon predicted, moving supervised release revocations into district
courts has placed defendants at a systematic disadvantage, as
prosecutors and judges are harsher than probation officers and parole
boards.315 To ensure a fair shot to defendants facing revocation of their
supervised release, they need more procedural protection than
parolees.
V. THE RIGHT TO A TIMELY REVOCATION HEARING
Haymond addressed the right to a jury trial, but a full
understanding of the relationship between parole and supervised
release should impact many areas of constitutional law. Indeed, the
309. Id. at 784; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479, 486.
310. United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014).
311. Id.
312. Judge Posner estimated that each probation officer now supervises thirty-six people. Id. at
710.
313. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Petersilia, supra
note 49, at 483 (“[P]arole has historically provided job assistance, family counseling, and chemical
dependency programs . . . . But punitive public attitudes, combined with diminishing social service
resources, have resulted in fewer services provided.”).
314. Cf. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787 (explaining that “the introduction of counsel” into a parole
revocation “will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding”).
315. See id. at 787–88.
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circuit courts have applied parole precedents to deny defendants on
supervised release myriad constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments, as well as the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.316 In light of the significant differences
between parole and supervised release outlined above, all these
decisions should be reconsidered.
One constitutional protection that is especially important to
reconsider is the right to a timely revocation hearing. Protection
against undue delay is among the oldest rights in Anglo-American
law, dating back to the Magna Carta and enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause.317 It is unique among procedural
rights in that it not only shields the innocent but also the guilty from
the “anxiety and concern” of long delay, as well as the “societal
interest” in efficient justice.318 The right to a timely hearing is
particularly vital in proceedings to revoke supervised release, because
the defendant will by definition have at least one prior conviction that
is a basis for denying him bail.319 Furthermore, “[t]he burden of
administering [supervised release] is heavy” and revocation
proceedings are easily brushed off as low scheduling priorities by
courts and attorneys.320
Perhaps most importantly, protection against undue delay
preserves the defendant’s ability to seek “imposition of a concurrent
sentence” and reduce his total term of imprisonment.321 The typical
fact pattern arises when a person under supervision is arrested and

316. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807, 811 (2d Cir. 2006) (Fifth and Sixth
Amendments); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005) (Sixth Amendment); United
States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393–94 (4th Cir. 1999) (Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir. 1994) (Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Copley,
978 F.2d 829, 831–32 (4th Cir. 1992) (Fifth Amendment). But see United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d
1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1994) (Ex Post Facto); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.
1993) (Ex Post Facto); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 526 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992) (Ex Post
Facto).
317. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223–26 (1967); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 858–59 (July 2004); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
318. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20, 532–33 (1972).
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(B) (2012).
320. Wooten, supra note 104, at 185; see also Stover, supra note 10, at 196–97.
321. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 733–34 (1985) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Smith
v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (“[T]he possibility that a defendant already in prison might
receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial
of the pending charge is postponed.”).
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charged with a new criminal offense.322 Because committing that
crime will also violate the conditions of the defendant’s release, the
probation office will file a petition to revoke his release.323 The
defendant will then face two parallel proceedings: a criminal
prosecution for the offense and a revocation proceeding for the
violation.
This is where the timing becomes very important. If the defendant
is sentenced for the offense around the same time that he is sentenced
for the violation, then he can serve those two sentences concurrently
with each other and reduce his total time in prison. Typically,
however, both sides will seek to delay the revocation hearing until
after the criminal prosecution is complete, because the government
will want to save resources by using the conviction at trial as automatic
proof of the violation, and the defendant will not want to present his
defense for the first time under the lower standard of proof applied to
revocation.324
But this is a very dangerous situation for the defendant, because
any delay after he is sentenced for the offense will deny him the
opportunity to seek imposition of a concurrent sentence for the
violation. In other words, he will have to serve his offense sentence
while waiting for his violation sentence, reducing his available time to
serve those sentences concurrently. The longer the delay, the more of
the offense sentence he will serve, and the more of the violation
sentence he will have to serve consecutively, increasing his total time
in prison. If the delay lasts long enough, he may complete the sentence
for the offense and be forced to serve an entirely consecutive sentence
for the violation, significantly increasing his total term of
imprisonment.

322. In “most” revocation cases, “the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing
another crime or has admitted the charges against him.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787
(1973).
323. Every term of supervised release must include a condition that the defendant “not commit
another Federal, State, or local crime . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012). The Double Jeopardy Clause
has been held not to prohibit revocation of release based on conduct that is also charged separately
as a new criminal offense. See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d
788, 789–90 (9th Cir. 1995).
324. See United States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 375–76 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Huusko, 275 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir.
2001); see also United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2004).
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Under Speedy Trial Clause precedents, a delay of more than one
year is presumptively unlawful,325 and delays of four or five years are
considered “extraordinary.”326 Yet the circuit courts have relied on the
Supreme Court’s parole precedents to reject challenges to four, five,
even twelve-year delays of hearings to revoke supervised release, even
when those delays denied the defendants the chance to seek a
concurrent sentence.327 These decisions must be reconsidered in light
of the three differences between parole and supervised release outlined
above:
• Because defendants have not been granted early release,
courts should apply more scrutiny to delayed hearings to
revoke supervised release.
• Because there is no rehabilitative justification for delaying
a hearing to revoke supervised release, courts should
measure delay from the date of accusation rather than the
date of custody.
• Because district courts do not have the same power as the
Parole Commission to impose retroactively concurrent
sentences, courts should recognize the harm defendants
suffer when they are denied the opportunity to seek a
concurrent sentence.

325. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992).
326. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Goode, 700 F. App’x 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (five-year delay);
United States v. Magnan, 700 F. App’x 838, 840 (10th Cir. 2017) (twelve-year delay); United States
v. Ivy, 678 F. App’x 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (six-year delay); United States v. Arellano, 645 F.
App’x 235, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016) (six-year delay); United States v. Griggs, 507 F. App’x 196,
200 (3d Cir. 2012) (two-year delay); United States v. Oidac, 486 F. App’x 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2012)
(twelve-year delay); United States v. Hicks, 453 F. App’x 940, 942 (11th Cir. 2012) (five-year
delay); United States v. Magana-Colin, 359 F. App’x 837, 837 (9th Cir. 2009) (three-year delay);
United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (two-year delay); United States v.
Gomez-Aguilar, 769 F. App’x 412 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, No. 19-6397, 2019 WL 6689793
(Dec. 9, 2019) (three-year delay); United States v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2000) (fouryear delay); United States v. Throneburg, 87 F.3d 851, 852 (6th Cir. 1996) (two-year delay); United
States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1994) (two-and-a-half-year delay); United States v.
Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (twenty-one-month delay); United States v. Manson,
No. 08-CR-877, 2014 WL 2434476 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014) (five-year delay); United States v.
Escobar-Izaguirre, No. 2:09 CR 110, 2011 WL 3321304 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2011) (two-year delay);
United States v. Herrera-Castellanos, No. 03-1825GT, 2010 WL 4639256 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2010)
(five-year delay); Allen v. United States, No. 3:04CR017-GHD, 2008 WL 5082119 (N.D. Miss.
Dec. 2, 2008) (three-year delay); United States v. Cobbs, 436 F. Supp. 2d 860, 861 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (five-year delay); United States v. Lopez, 985 F. Supp. 59, 60 (D.R.I. 1997) (thirty-two
month delay).
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In sum, courts should provide defendants on supervised release
more protection against delay than parolees by scrutinizing delays
more carefully, measuring delay from the date of formal accusation,
and recognizing the prejudice that results from a lost concurrent
sentence.
A. No Early Release Justifying Reduced Constitutional Protection
Because supervised release is an additional penalty rather than a
relief from punishment, courts should be less tolerant of delayed
hearings to revoke supervised release. Although the Supreme Court’s
narrow reading of the Speedy Trial Clause likely excludes proceedings
to revoke supervised release,328 defendants are still protected by the
due process right to a hearing “within a reasonable time.”329 Speedy
trial precedents are “applicable . . . by analogy,” even if they are not
“directly controlling.”330
Though recognizing the right to a timely revocation hearing, the
circuit courts have so far provided defendants on supervised release
the same meagre safeguards against delay they afforded to parolees.331
Speedy Trial Clause precedents recognize “anxiety and concern” as
sufficient harm to establish a constitutional violation,332 yet the courts
have held that defendants challenging delayed revocation hearings
must show prejudice “aside from the anxiety of awaiting . . .
revocation proceedings.”333 The courts have also permitted extremely
long delays of revocation hearings that would never pass muster at
trial.334 These limited protections should be reconsidered, because
defendants on supervised release have a stronger claim to speedy trial
rights than parolees, making long delays more unreasonable and more
stressful.
At a parole revocation hearing, the hearing body had to decide
whether to revoke the parolee’s grant of release as part of a failed
“risk” that he would not engage in further antisocial behavior.335 That
328. See Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016); see also Goode, 700 F. App’x at 103;
Ivy, 678 F. App’x at 372; Oidac, 486 F. App’x at 321; Ramos, 401 F.3d at 115; Tippens, 39 F.3d at
89 (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976)).
329. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972).
330. See United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 2008).
331. See id. at 1261.
332. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20, 532 (1972).
333. Oidac, 486 F. App’x at 322–23; see also Santana, 526 F.3d at 1261.
334. See supra note 312.
335. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
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risk entitled the government to delay the revocation proceeding in
order to maximize its available information.336 In fact, deferring the
revocation hearing arguably helped the parolee by allowing him to
retain the “benefit” of the release for more time.337
At a supervised release revocation hearing, by contrast, the court
is not reviewing a failed “risk,” because the defendant has not been
granted early release, but instead has served his prison sentence in full,
followed by a term of supervision in the community. The government
therefore has less justification for postponing the proceedings. A
delayed hearing to revoke supervised release also inflicts more
“anxiety and concern” than a parole revocation, because the defendant
faces uncertain punishment freshly determined by the district judge,
rather than a return to prison for the balance of a remaining prison
term.338
Although Speedy Trial Clause precedents do not directly control
revocation of supervised release, they should be treated as more
persuasive in this context than under parole. Multi-year delays that
were not previously considered unreasonable should be viewed with
greater skepticism. Courts should also acknowledge the harm that long
delay does to defendants on supervised release by causing them
anxiety and concern about the upcoming proceedings.
B. No Rehabilitative Reason for Delaying Hearing
Because supervised release revocations are more punitive than
parole revocations, there is less justification for delaying the
proceedings. Like delayed trials, therefore, delayed hearings to revoke
supervised release should be measured from the date of official
accusation. The circuit courts, however, are currently split over how
to measure delayed hearings to revoke supervised release. Some courts
measure from the filing of the violation petition, while others measure
from the date of custody. This issue is outcome determinative in many
cases,339 reflecting profound disagreement about how to analyze

336. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976).
337. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019)
(No. 17-1672).
338. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–20, 532 (1972).
339. For example, imagine a defendant on supervised release who commits a new crime and is
held in state custody for five years pending resolution of his state case, and only then is finally
transferred to federal custody for a revocation hearing. Measuring from the date of the violation
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delayed hearings to revoke release. In recognition of the different
theories of punishment that animate parole and supervised release
revocation, courts should resolve this split by measuring delayed
supervised release revocations from the filing of the violation petition.
The measurement of delayed hearings to revoke supervised
release has split the circuit courts. At least two courts officially
measure delay from the filing of the violation petition, holding that
like criminal trials, delayed hearings to revoke supervised release
should be measured from the date of official accusation.340 Several
other circuit panels, by contrast, have measured from the date of
custody, holding that, like delayed parole revocations, delayed
hearings to revoke supervised release should be measured from the
date the defendant is actually imprisoned for the violation.341 Finally,
two circuit courts have combined these approaches, holding that delay
should be measured from the filing of the violation petition with
respect to prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend against the
violation, but from the date of custody with respect to any other kind
of prejudice.342
Resolving this circuit split requires reexamining the rehabilitative
logic of Moody. In that case, the Supreme Court denied the parolee’s
request for a “prompt” parole revocation hearing by citing the
“practical” justification that delaying the hearing was essential to its
rehabilitative function.343 Since the parolee was in prison for a new
crime and had obviously violated his conditions of release, “the only
remaining inquiry” at the hearing would be a “prediction” of whether
petition would make the delay five years, while measuring from the date of custody would make
the delay negligible. See, e.g., United States v. Goode, 700 F. App’x 100 (3d Cir. 2017).
340. See United States v. Rasmussen, 881 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1989); see also United States
v. Oidac, 486 F. App’x 318, 321, 322 n.8 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Pagan-Rodriguez, 600
F.3d 39, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Cockrane, No. 96-4470, 1997 WL 51646, at *1
(4th Cir. Feb. 10, 1997).
341. See United States v. Ivy, 678 F. App’x 369, 373–74 (6th Cir. 2017); see also United States
v. Arellano, 645 F. App’x 235, 236 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Magana-Colin, 359 F. App’x
837, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cunningham, 150 F. App’x 994, 996 (11th Cir. 2005).
342. See United States v. Ramos, 401 F.3d 111, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1994). These cases hold that delay between the filing of the
petition and the hearing is prejudicial only if it “substantially limit[s] the ability to defend against
the charge that the conditions of supervised release were violated.” Ramos, 401 F.3d at 116; see
also Tippens, 39 F.3d at 90 (“delay in executing a violator’s warrant” contravenes due process only
“if the delay undermines his ability to contest the issue of the violation or to proffer mitigating
evidence”). Aside from this specific kind of prejudice, the defendant has no cause to complain
about a delayed hearing “until he is taken into custody.” Ramos, 401 F.3d at 115.
343. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 81, 89 (1976).
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he had been cured of his “antisocial” tendencies and was ready to
return to the community.344 “In making this prophecy,” the Court said,
“a parolee’s institutional record can be perhaps one of the most
significant factors.”345 It therefore made sense to delay the hearing
until the defendant was actually taken into custody on the violation
warrant, at which point that “prediction [wa]s both most relevant and
most accurate.”346
When sentencing a defendant for a supervised release violation,
by contrast, district judges are forbidden from considering
rehabilitation.347 Rather, they must “primarily aim[] at sanctioning
th[e] [defendant’s] breach [of trust]”348 or, “analogously, . . . ‘provide
just punishment for the offense’ of violating supervised release.”349
Judges are instructed to focus on “the seriousness of the underling
violation and the criminal history of the offender,”350 not the
defendant’s “institutional record.”351 There is therefore no
rehabilitative justification for delaying the revocation hearing. In fact,
rather than aid in the revocation decision, delay after the filing of the
violation petition is likely to reduce the accuracy of the hearing, which
is aimed at determining a punishment for a past violation, not
predicting future conduct.
Because supervised release revocation is a more punitive
proceeding than parole revocation, Moody’s approach to measuring
delay does not apply. Instead, delay should be measured from the date
of the official accusation, which is the filing of the violation petition.
This approach will not only ensure the accuracy of the hearings, but
also protect the defendant’s constitutional rights by ensuring that the
court considers the full extent of the delay.

344. Id. at 89.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012) (“The court, in determining whether to impose a term of
imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the
term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.”).
348. United States v. Phillips, 791 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2015).
349. United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007).
350. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
351. Cf. Moody, 429 U.S. at 89 (explaining that the defendant’s “institutional record” is one of
the most important factors in a parole revocation hearing).
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C. No Administrative Flexibility to Impose
Retroactively Concurrent Sentence
Because district courts do not have the same power as the Parole
Commission to impose retroactively concurrent sentences, delay can
harm a defendant on supervised release by depriving him of the
opportunity to seek concurrent sentencing. The courts of appeals,
however, have failed to recognize this harm, confusing the broad
administrative authority of the Commission with the more limited
power of district courts. As a result, the courts have wrongly applied
parole precedents to deny challenges to delayed hearings to revoke
supervised release, even where those delays denied defendants their
opportunity to seek concurrent sentences and thereby increased their
total time in prison.
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sanchez352
provides vivid illustration of this unfortunate pattern. The defendant
in that case was serving a five-year term of supervised release when
he was arrested by local police and pled guilty to a state drug charge.353
He served approximately two years in state prison and was released.354
Over four years later, the federal government sought to revoke his
supervised release based on the state drug conviction.355 The district
court revoked his release and sentenced him to another eighteen
months imprisonment.356
On appeal, the defendant argued that the four-year delay violated
his right to a revocation hearing within a reasonable time, because it
cost him the chance to seek a sentence for the violation that would run
concurrently to his state prison term.357 The Second Circuit rejected
this argument, noting that under “Moody . . . [the defendant] was not
prejudiced by the delay because the district court had the power to
grant the equivalent of a concurrent sentence retroactively for [the
defendant’s] violation of supervised release.”358 Multiple other courts
of appeals have since applied this same reasoning to hold that

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

225 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id.
Id.
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defendants are not prejudiced by delayed hearings to revoke
supervised release.359
These decisions are demonstrably wrong, however, because
district courts do not have the same power as the Parole Commission
to impose retroactively concurrent sentences. Under the parole
regulations, the Commission was empowered to credit a parolee for
any time served on criminal conduct underlying a parole violation.360
Thus, as the Supreme Court said in Moody, the Commission could
“grant, retroactively, the equivalent of concurrent sentences.”361 As a
result, a delayed parole revocation could not harm a parolee by
denying him the chance to seek a concurrent sentence, because the
Parole Commission could always grant the parolee credit toward the
violation sentence for the time he had already served on the underlying
offense.362
District courts, by contrast, have no authority to impose
retroactively concurrent sentences. Instead, federal law mandates that
“[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received . . . at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.”363 Courts may not “award credit at
sentencing” for time served,364 nor may they impose a sentence
359. See United States v. Goode, 700 F. App’x 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he District Court
certainly could have ordered . . . that [the defendant’s] federal sentence for violating supervised
release run retroactively concurrently with his state sentence.”); United States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d
88, 90 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[The defendant] has not been prejudiced by the delay. It did not impair his
ability to contest the revocation. And, the district court had the ability ‘to grant, retroactively, the
equivalent of concurrent sentences.’” (quoting Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976))); United
States v. Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he passage of twenty-one months in no
way restricted the court’s ability ‘to grant, retroactively, the equivalent of concurrent sentences.’”
(quoting Moody, 429 U.S. at 87)); see also United States v. Garrett, 253 F.3d 443, 447–48 (9th Cir.
2001) (“The Court in Moody unambiguously held that the federal government is not constitutionally
required to writ a defendant out of state custody and into federal custody for purposes of executing
a violation warrant. Furthermore, the opinion clarifies that a defendant cannot claim prejudice from
such a delay on the ground that he is unable to serve his multiple sentences concurrently.”); United
States v. Escobar-Izaguirre, No. 2:09-CR 110, 2011 WL 3321304, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2011);
United States v. Lopez, 985 F. Supp. 59, 64–65 (D.R.I. 1997).
360. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.21(b)(1)–(2) (1976) (“If a finding is made that the prisoner has engaged
in behavior constituting new criminal conduct . . . [t]ime served on a new state or federal sentence
shall be credited as time in custody.”).
361. Moody, 429 U.S. at 87–88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.21, 2.52(c)(2) (1976)).
362. See id. at 87.
363. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2012); see also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir.
1980) (“[A] federal sentence cannot commence prior to the date it is pronounced, even if made
concurrent with a sentence already being served.”).
364. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333–34 (1992); see also United States v. Gonzalez,
192 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 1999).

(7) 53.3_SCHUMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

642

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

7/7/2020 2:51 PM

[Vol. 53:587

concurrent with one the defendant has already completed.365 At best,
a judge can recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant
receive credit for time served on another prison term,366 but that
recommendation is not binding and the Bureau has the final say.367
The Sentencing Guidelines, moreover, recommend that revocation
sentences run consecutively to other prison sentences, even if they are
based on the same conduct.368
Because district courts do not have the same power as the Parole
Commission to impose retroactively concurrent sentences, Moody
does not apply to defendants on supervised release. Instead, a delayed
hearing to revoke supervised release can inflict substantial harm on a
defendant by denying him the chance to seek a concurrent sentence
and forcing him to serve his violation sentence consecutively to the
offense sentence, thereby extending his total time in prison. A longer
prison term is a vivid form of unconstitutional prejudice and deserves
recognition when courts review challenges to delayed hearings to
revoke supervised release.
VI. CONCLUSION
The replacement of parole with supervised release transformed
federal community supervision in dramatic ways that should be
reflected in constitutional law. Although the circuit courts regard them
as “constitutionally indistinguishable,”369 there are actually three key
differences between parole and supervised release: their method of
365. See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Nothing . . . authorizes the
district court to extend the benefit of a concurrent sentence to . . . those who have previously served
sentences, now completed, for related crimes.”); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“A district court . . . does not have the authority to impose a sentence to be served
concurrently with a discharged sentence.”); United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.
1998) (“There is no provision . . . stating that the court may order that the sentence it imposes be
deemed to have been served concurrently with a prior prison term that has been fully discharged.”).
366. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012); see also Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 356–58
(9th Cir. 1999); McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1998); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d
476, 477–78 (3d Cir. 1990).
367. See Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The district court’s recommendation was not binding
on BOP, as we have explained.”). A truly determined judge might attempt to achieve the same
effect as a retroactively concurrent sentence by imposing a shorter prison term, see United States
v. Dorsey, 166 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 1999), but that would require a downward variance from the
range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines.
368. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.4(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
369. United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005).
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imposition (relief/penalty), their theory of punishment
(rehabilitative/punitive),
and
their
governing
institutions
(agency/courts).
These differences change how the Constitution applies to each
system, calling into question numerous circuit court decisions
applying parole precedents to supervised release. The Supreme
Court’s parole revocation decisions depended on parole’s unique
nature as an administrative process aimed at rehabilitating prisoners
by granting them early release. Those decisions do not apply to
supervised release, which instead is a judicial sentence imposed to
punish defendants beyond their original prison terms.
Supervised released is truly a “unique” form of post-release
supervision,370 a significant feature of the federal justice system that
impacts nearly every criminal defendant and is responsible for the
incarceration of tens of thousands. It requires a fresh constitutional
analysis, based on its distinctive qualities, to ensure that mass
supervision does not overtake the “ancient protections” of the Bill of
Rights.371

370. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407–08 (1991).
371. See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2019).

(7) 53.3_SCHUMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

644

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

7/7/2020 2:51 PM

[Vol. 53:587

